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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of this
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly affected earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other potential cases
of interest. As a special project, the Associate Editors assisted in writing
the Review for the North Dakota Law Review. The following topics are
included in the Review:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS—REVIEW OF
PARTICULAR QUESTIONS ............................................... 1086
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
AND OPERATION................................................................ 1094
CIVIL RIGHTS—FEDERAL REMEDIES—LIABILITY OF
MUNICIPALITIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL
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COMMERCIAL LAW—BILLS AND NOTES—RIGHTS AND
LIABILITIES ON INDORSEMENT OR TRANSFER ...... 1100
COURTS—ISSUANCE OF REMEDIAL WRITS ......................... 1104
CRIMINAL LAW—INVESTIGATORY STOPS—MOTOR
VEHICLES ............................................................................. 1107
CRIMINAL LAW—AUTOMOBILES—ARREST, STOP, AND
INQUIRY ................................................................................ 1110
CRIMINAL LAW—INVESTIGATORY STOPS—MOTOR
VEHICLES ............................................................................. 1114
CRIMINAL LAW—INVESTIGATORY STOPS—MOTOR
VEHICLES ............................................................................. 1117
CRIMINAL LAW—JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS—
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CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT ......... 1124
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CRIMINAL LAW—TRIAL—RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO
CONFRONT WITNESS ........................................................ 1130
CRIMINAL LAW—REVIEW—SCOPE OF REVIEW................. 1134
CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—MOTOR
VEHICLES ............................................................................. 1136
CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—WAIVER
AND CONSENT .................................................................... 1138
FAMILY LAW—CHILD CUSTODY............................................. 1141
FAMILY LAW—DIVORCE—CHILD CUSTODY AND
VISITATION.......................................................................... 1145
INSURANCE LAW—AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE—
UNINSURED OR UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE........................................................................... 1147
INSURANCE LAW—AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE—
UNINSURED OR UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE........................................................................... 1151
INSURANCE LAW—CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY.................. 1154
LANDLORD AND TENANT—RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY
OF POSSESSION BY LANDLORD.................................... 1158
TORT—NEGLIGENCE—
RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY.................................. 1161
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW – PROCEEDINGS TO
SECURE COMPENSATION—ATTORNEY’S FEES....... 1165
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS—REVIEW OF PARTICULAR QUESTIONS
NORTH DAKOTA STATE BD. OF MED. EXAMINERS-INVESTIGATIVE PANEL B V.
HSU
The North Dakota State Board of Medical Examiners (Board) appealed
a district court judgment that reversed a Board decision to revoke Dr.
George Hsu’s license to practice medicine and a writ of mandamus ordering
the Board to establish a reasonable plan of supervision of Dr. Hsu.1 The

1. N. D. State Bd. of Med. Examiners-Investigative Panel B v. Hsu, 2007 ND 9, ¶ 1, 726
N.W.2d 216, 219.
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Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court’s judgment that
reversed the Board’s order revoking Dr. Hsu’s license, and the court
reversed the writ of mandamus ordered by the district court.2 However, the
court affirmed the district court’s judgment to reject Dr. Hsu’s due process
and equal protection challenges.3 Additionally, the supreme court reversed
the award of attorney’s fees to Dr. Hsu.4
Dr. Hsu is a board-certified family practitioner, who had been licensed
in North Dakota since 1985.5 He operated rural health clinics in Elgin and
Glen Ullin since 1987.6 In 2003 and 2004, the Board brought several
complaints against him.7 In the September 2003 complaint, an investigative
panel of the Board alleged that Dr Hsu “had engaged in a continued pattern
of inappropriate care of seven patients in violation of the N.D.C.C. § 43-1731(21) and had failed to appropriately document medical records for those
patients.”8 Following a formal hearing for the 2003 complaint, the administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended a finding that Dr. Hsu “had engaged
in a continued pattern of inappropriate care from July 2001 through June
2003 for the seven patients identified in the complaint.”9 The ALJ concluded Dr. Hsu “demonstrated a continued pattern of inappropriate care”
towards his patients, and therefore, the ALJ recommended the revocation of
Dr. Hsu’s medical license unless Dr. Hsu agreed to a plan of monitoring by
the Board.10
On March 19, 2004, a second investigative panel of the Board issued a
complaint against Dr. Hsu that re-alleged the claims in the 2003 complaint,
and additionally alleged that Dr. Hsu provided inappropriate care to three
other patients between December 2003 and January 2004.11 At the March
19, 2004, meeting, the Board temporarily suspended Dr. Hsu’s license to
practice, and then unanimously voted to adopt the ALJ’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law.12 Nevertheless, the Board neither revoked Dr.
Hsu’s license nor adopted the ALJ’s recommended sanctions.13 Instead, the

2. Id. ¶ 45, 726 N.W.2d at 235.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. ¶ 2, 726 N.W.2d at 219.
6. Id.
7. Id. ¶ 3.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. ¶ 4.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Board delayed the disposition of the 2003 complaint until after a hearing
was held on the March 19, 2004, complaint.14
Following the hearing on the March 19, 2004, complaint, the ALJ
issued a decision taking official notice of the 2003 disciplinary hearing.15
“[T]he ALJ recommended finding that Dr. Hsu provided substandard or
inappropriate care for one patient . . . [but] did not provide substandard or
inappropriate care for the two other patients.”16 Additionally, the ALJ
determined that Dr. Hsu failed to properly document the medical care of
two patients.17 After reviewing the ALJ’s findings and conclusions, the
Board adopted all but one of the ALJ’s conclusions.18 The Board declined
to adopt the ALJ’s recommendation that Dr. Hsu be monitored, and instead
concluded that Dr. Hsu’s license should be revoked.19
Dr. Hsu appealed the decision to the district court, alleging that the
Board’s use of an investigator, who was also a Board member, violated due
process.20 Dr. Hsu further alleged that the use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard in the Board’s disciplinary hearings violated due process
and equal protection.21 The district court found these arguments unpersuasive, but concluded that the Board violated section 28-32-39(3) of the North
Dakota Century Code by delaying a decision on the ALJ’s recommendations regarding the 2003 complaint.22 The district court further held that
the Board offered an insufficient rationale for departing from the ALJ’s
recommended disposition.23 Therefore, the district court adopted the ALJ’s
recommendation for the disposition of the 2003 complaint and reversed the
Board’s order to revoke Dr. Hsu’s license.24
The Board elected not to appeal the decision of the district court.25
Instead, the Board issued additional rationale explaining why it did not accept the ALJ’s recommended disposition.26 The Board’s rationale included:
(1) the seriousness of the departure from the standard of care; (2) Dr. Hsu’s
prior behavior; (3) Dr. Hsu’s attitude; and, (4) the Board’s belief that the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. ¶ 5, 726 N.W.2d at 219-20.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6, 726 N.W.2d at 221.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
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ALJ’s proposed system of monitoring was unworkable.27 Dr. Hsu petitioned for, and was issued, a writ of mandamus from the district court.28
Additionally, the district court granted attorney’s fees to Dr. Hsu in accordance with section 28-32-50 of the North Dakota Century Code.29
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota first examined the role
of the district court in the administrative hearings process.30 “By definition,
the Board is an administrative agency, and its procedures for physician
licensure and discipline are governed by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C ch. 28-32.”31 Accordingly, a district court must affirm an
administrative agency’s decision, unless: (1) the order is not in accordance
with the law; (2) the order violates the constitutional rights of the appellant;
(3) the provisions of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act have not
been followed; (4) the appellant was not afforded a fair hearing because of
the rules or procedure of the agency; (5) the findings of fact are not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence; (6) the conclusions of the
agency lack factual support; (7) the findings of fact fail to address the
evidence presented by the appellant; or (8) the conclusions of the agency
fail to explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting the recommendation
of the ALJ.32 However, when the North Dakota Supreme Court evaluates
an administrative agency’s decision on appeal, the court may not substitute
its judgment for that of the particular administrative agency, nor can the
court make independent findings.33 The court must evaluate the administrative agency’s factual conclusions under a standard of “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions
reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire
record.”34
Applying the standard of review, the court addressed Dr. Hsu’s claims
that the district court erred in finding that the Board’s decision did not
violate his due process or equal protection rights.35 Section 28-32-46(5) of
the North Dakota Century Code requires the Board’s findings regarding
proof for physician disciplinary proceedings to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence standard.36 Dr. Hsu argued that this standard violates
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 221-25.
Id. ¶ 9, 726 N.W.2d at 225.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 726 N.W. 2d at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13, 726 N.W.2d at 226-27.
Id. ¶ 14, 726 N.W.2d at 227.
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due process because “a revocation proceeding potentially takes away a
private property interest, prohibits a doctor from practicing his profession,
and subjects a doctor to public embarrassment.”37
The United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge38 established
a three-part test for due process challenges.39 The Mathews test requires a
balance of:
(1) the nature of the private interest affected by the governmental
action;
(2) the countervailing nature of the governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail; and
(3) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.40
This test has been used by the United States Supreme Court in challenges to
standards of proof under due process grounds.41
Upon examining other United States Supreme Court holdings and the
holdings of similar cases in other jurisdictions, the North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that the framework identified in Mathews is satisfied by
the preponderance of the evidence standard for medical disciplinary
proceedings.42 First, the court recognized that a physician’s interest in a
medical license is a property interest, and therefore, is substantial.43 However, the court concluded that “the State’s interest in protecting the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens is superior to a licensee’s interest.”44 The
court further held the Administrative Agencies Practices Act, chapters 4317 and 43-17.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, and the legislature’s
responsibility to protect the public all support its decision that the
preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process under the
Mathews test.45

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. ¶ 15.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Hsu, ¶ 17, 726 N.W.2d at 227 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-49).
Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332).
Id. ¶ 18, 726 N.W.2d at 227.
Id. ¶¶ 19- 27, 726 N.W.2d at 228-30.
Id. ¶ 27, 726 N.W.2d at 230.
Id.
Id.
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An administrative agency does not violate due process simply because
it engages in the three functions of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication at an administrative proceeding.46 A medical disciplinary proceeding
is protected under procedural and statutory safeguards, thus when the Board
is made up of trained and experienced professionals whose functions are
separated, the risk of error is minimized.47 As such, the court concluded
“the preponderance of evidence standard for medical disciplinary proceedings satisfies due process under the Mathews framework.”48
Dr. Hsu argued that the use of the preponderance of evidence in his
case violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions because North Dakota imposes a more rigorous standard of clear and
convincing evidence concerning attorney disciplinary hearings.49 The three
standards for reviewing equal protection claims: (1) strict scrutiny, when a
suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental right is involved; (2)
intermediate scrutiny, when an important substantive right is involved; and,
(3) rational basis, when no suspect class, fundamental right, or important
substantive right is involved.50 Applying these standards, the court determined Dr. Hsu had not clearly presented a separate equal protection argument under the state constitution.51 Therefore, his equal protection argument was reviewed under the strict scrutiny and rational-basis standards,
but because the court determined that there was no fundamental right at
issue or suspect class involved, it evaluated Dr. Hsu’s equal protection
claims under the rational basis standard.52
Under the rational basis standard of review, the court evaluated
whether a less stringent burden of proof for discipline of medical licensees
versus other professional licensees violated equal protection.53 The court
stated, “[t]he legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard
for physician discipline and this Court, governing body for attorneys, has
chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline. The separation of powers between the legislature and this Court forms a rational
basis for the different standards.”54 As an illustration, the court explained
the effects that an adversarial relationship of attorney-client and a non-

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 29, 726 N.W.2d at 230-31.
Id. ¶ 30, 726 N.W.2d at 213.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id.
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adversarial relationship of physician-patient have on disciplinary actions.55
For example, an unhappy client may file a disciplinary complaint against
her attorney for losing at trial, but the imposition of a higher standard of
proof on attorney disciplinary complaints filters out meritless complaints.56
The physician, however, is engaged in a non-adversarial relationship with
his patient therefore there is no loser resulting from the physician-patient
relationship.57 Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that the use of a preponderance of evidence standard in Dr. Hsu’s case did
not violate equal protection.58
Dr. Hsu next argued that the district court erred in deciding the Board
did not violate due process because the Board’s investigator, Dr.
Lambrecht, had personal and financial conflicts of interest.59 First, Dr. Hsu
alleged that because Dr. Lambrecht’s mother was denied a job with the
National Guard in 1985 due to complaints brought by Dr. Hsu, Dr.
Lambrecht had a personal conflict.60 Second, Dr. Hsu alleged that
Medcenter One had a competing clinic in Elgin, and because Dr. Lambrecht
was an employee of Medcenter One in Bismarck, Dr. Lambrecht had a
financial conflict.61 Therefore, Dr. Hsu asserted that his due process rights
were violated when an investigator with these conflicts sits on the Board.62
The North Dakota Supreme Court found Dr. Hsu’s assertions unpersuasive
even though section 43-17-07.2 of the North Dakota Century Code bars
Board members, who have served on the investigative panel, from also
serving in an adjudicative capacity during the hearing.63 Specifically, the
court noted that statutory safeguards are present during the administrative
agency’s investigation and adjudication proceedings to prevent violations of
due process.64 Therefore, the court held that Dr. Lambrecht’s participation
as an investigator of the complaints did not violate due process, and the
district court did err in concluding that Dr. Hsu’s due process and equal
protection rights were not violated.65

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. ¶ 33, 726 N.W.2d at 232.
59. Id. ¶ 34.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-07.2 (2005) (providing that a member of the board
that acts in that capacity may not participate in adjudication affecting the member’s personal,
professional or pecuniary interest).
64. Hsu, ¶ 36, 726 N.W.2d at 232.
65. Id. at 233.
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The Board argued that the district court erred in finding that the Board
violated section 28-32-39(3) of the North Dakota Century Code by delaying
its ruling in the 2003 complaint.66 Specifically, the Board argued that the
district court erred in reversing the Board’s order that revoked Dr. Hsu’s
medical license, and in issuing a writ of mandamus that compelled the
Board to adopt the ALJ’s recommendations.67 Under section 28-32-39(3),
an ALJ’s recommendations become final unless the recommendations are
amended or rejected.68 The court concluded that North Dakota statutes did
not prevent the Board from temporarily suspending Dr. Hsu’s license to
initiate new proceedings to incorporate allegations from the 2003 complaint.69 Additionally, the court concluded that the Board’s action in
delaying disposition did not preclude the Board from considering the
cumulative effects of Dr. Hsu’s conduct in the 2004 complaint.70 The court
held that generally, “the determination of the appropriate sanction to be
imposed by the Board is a matter of discretion.”71 According to the court,
the Board’s conclusions are entitled to “appreciable deference” because the
determination of a physician’s standard of care and requirements for documentation involve technical matters, and a majority of the Board members
are practicing physicians.72 More importantly, courts may not substitute
their judgment for that of the administrative agency, nor may the courts
reweigh the evidence.73 Applying a deferential standard of review, the
court determined that the Board’s sanctions were legal, and that the Board
did not abuse its discretion in revoking Dr. Hsu’s license.74 Therefore, the
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the part of the district court’s
judgment that reversed the Board’s order to revoke Dr. Hsu’s license and
reversed the order to issue a writ of mandamus, but affirmed the finding
that Dr. Hsu’s due process and equal protection rights were not violated.75

66. Id. ¶ 37.
67. Id.
68. Id. ¶ 40, 726 N.W.2d at 234; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-39(3) (2005) (providing in
part, “[t]he recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law and the recommended order
become final unless specifically amended or rejected by the agency head”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. ¶ 42 (citing Larsen v. Comm’n on Med. Competency, 1998 ND 193, ¶¶ 32, 35, 585
N.W.2d 801, 808-09).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 235 (citing Huff v. N. D. State Bd. of Med. Examiners-Investigative Panel B, 2004
ND 225, ¶ 8, 690 N.W.2d 221, 226).
74. Id. ¶ 44.
75. Id. ¶ 45.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION
STATE V. ALTRU HEALTH SYS.
In State ex rel. Workforce Safety & Insurance v. Altru Health
Systems,76 Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) appealed and Altru
Health Systems (Altru) cross-appealed a district court order that denied
WSI’s motion for contempt, permitted WSI to conduct depositions of Altru
physicians, and prohibited WSI from deposing the physicians on events
from a videotaped surveillance of the claimant.77 The Supreme Court of
North Dakota affirmed the order, holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion.78
During a fraud investigation, WSI asked Altru to allow WSI’s special
investigation unit to question claimant’s treating physician and physician’s
assistant.79 Altru denied WSI’s request and WSI requested an administrative subpoena on July 30, 2005, to take depositions of the physician and
physician’s assistant.80 The physician and physician’s assistant refused to
be deposed.81 Therefore, WSI brought an action under section 65-02-11 of
the North Dakota Century Code to enforce the administrative subpoenas.82
On September 1, 2005, the district court issued an order to enforce the
subpoenas.83 The order provided that WSI was not required to give notice
to the claimant before deposing the physician and physician’s assistant and
that neither the physician nor the physician’s assistant was required to
review the videotaped surveillance before being deposed.84 WSI again
issued administrative subpoenas on the physician and physician’s assistant
and scheduled depositions for October 27, 2005.85 At the depositions,
WSI’s counsel informed the physician’s assistant that she would be shown
videotaped surveillance and would be asked questions based on the events
shown on the videotape.86 The physician’s assistant, however, refused to
watch the videotape; she was deposed without being questioned on the
events of the videotape.87

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

2007 ND 38, 729 N.W.2d 113.
Altru, ¶ 1, 729 N.W.2d at 114.
Id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 729 N.W.2d at 120.
Id. ¶ 2, 729 N.W.2d at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4, 729 N.W.2d at 114.
Id.
Id.
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On November 4, 2005, WSI filed a contempt motion to enforce the
September 1, 2005, order.88 On February 9, 2006, the district court responded with an order that denied both parties’ requests for sanctions, but
the district court clarified its prior order: (1) neither party was required to
review the videotaped surveillance before being deposed; (2) section 65-0211 of the North Dakota Century Code permits WSI to examine witnesses
and subpoena records, but it does not mandate that “the requested
deponents become expert witnesses for WSI”; (3) claimant’s treating
physician and physician’s assistant were not required to watch the
videotaped surveillance.89 Consequently, WSI appealed and Altru crossappealed.90 WSI argued that under section 65-02-11, “[t]he organization
may make investigation as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of all the parties . . . and generally to do anything
necessary to facilitate or promote the efficient administration of this title.”91
Specifically, WSI claimed that the language, “generally to do anything
necessary,” granted WSI the authority to question the physician and
physician’s assistant on the events of the videotaped surveillance.92
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court had to determine the
scope of judicial inquiry and the court’s standard of review under section
65-02-11 of the North Dakota Century Code.93 Because the court had not
previously determined the scope of judicial inquiry and the standard of
review under 65-02-11, this case was one of first impression.94 Therefore,
the court began its analysis by evaluating precedent governing a district
court’s power to enforce administrative subpoenas.95 A district court may
enforce an administrative subpoena when: “(1) the subpoena is within the
statutory authority of the [administrative] agency; (2) the information
sought is reasonably relevant to the inquiry of the administrative proceeding; (3) the subpoena is reasonably specific; and (4) the subpoena is not
unduly broad or burdensome.”96
Because the district court limited the scope of the subpoena, WSI
argued that the district court erred.97 Specifically, WSI argued that the

88. Id. ¶ 5.
89. Id. at 115.
90. Id. ¶ 6.
91. Id. ¶ 9, 729 N.W.2d at 116 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-11 (2003)).
92. Id. ¶ 10.
93. Id. ¶ 11.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting Medical Arts Clinic, P.C. v. Franciscan Initiatives, Inc., 531 N.W.2d 289,
300-01 (N.D. 1995)).
97. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 729 N.W.2d at 116-17.
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broad language of section 65-02-11 permitted WSI to do “anything necessary to facilitate or promote the efficient administration of [Title 65].” 98
The district court determined that WSI’s interpretation of section 65-02-11
was beyond the scope of the statute.99 The supreme court adhered to the
district court’s interpretation of section 65-02-11 because WSI’s interpretation of the “anything necessary” language would lead to unreasonable or
absurd consequences.100 Furthermore, the court stated that section 65-05-30
of the North Dakota Century Code restricts the type of information that
WSI may obtain from the claimant’s physician.101 Section 65-05-30 provides that the claimant consents to the use of medical information that is
within “the course of any examination or treatment of the claimant.”102
Therefore, section 65-05-30 “does not give a claimant’s consent for the
claimant’s treating physician to provide expert opinion or become an
expert witness outside of the examining physician’s examination or
treatment.”103
The court acknowledged that due process concerns are minimized
when the parties are in investigative process, as in the present case.104
Nevertheless, the court stated that WSI sought to obtain new expert opinion
by trying to depose the physician and physician’s assistant on the events of
the videotape.105 The court determined that due process concerns were
implicated because WSI sought new information.106 Specifically, the court
stated that WSI’s request for new information interfered with the claimant’s
existing physician-patient relationship, which extended beyond the scope of
section 65-05-30.107 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the district court did not err in limiting the effect of WSI’s subpoena.108

98. Id. ¶ 14, 729 N.W.2d at 117 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-11 (2003)).
99. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 16.
101. Id. ¶ 19, 729 N.W.2d at 118.
102. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-30 (2003)).
103. Id. ¶ 20.
104. Id. ¶ 23, 729 N.W.2d at 119.
105. Id. ¶ 24.
106. Id. at 119-20.
107. Id. at 120.
108. Id. ¶ 25.
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CIVIL RIGHTS—FEDERAL REMEDIES—LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITIES AND
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
STRAND V. CASS COUNTY
In Strand v. Cass County,109 John Strand and Cass County residents
appealed from a dismissal of a civil rights claim and abuse of action process
for dismissing attorney fees in an action to protect a historic Cass County
jail.110 The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s
jury instructions on a civil rights claim.111 The court reversed the district
court’s order denying Strand’s request for attorney fees, and remanded for
reconsideration.112 Justice Maring concurred.113
Cass County approved a one-half cent sales tax increase to finance the
construction of a new jail in the late 1990s.114 As a result, the County decided to tear down the existing jail and sheriff’s residence.115 John Strand
and a group of Cass County residents known as “Save the Jail” (hereinafter
“Strand”) engaged in a series of actions to prevent the demolition, because
both buildings were listed on the National Registry of Historic Places.116
The County awarded bids to demolish the buildings on February 18, 2003,
but on February 25, 2003, the Attorney General issued an opinion
declaring, “Cass County may not destroy the residence without the State
Historical Board’s approval.”117
The State Historical Board consented to the demolition of the jail at its
meeting on March 11, 2003, but did not approve the demolition of the
sheriff’s residence until a subsequent meeting on April 11, 2003.118 Also
on April 11, 2003, the Attorney General issued an opinion interpreting
chapter 11-11 of the North Dakota Century Code.119 In his opinion, the
Attorney General stated that chapter 11-11 requires Cass County to submit
the project to a vote if it would constitute an “extraordinary expenditure.”120

109. 2006 ND 190, 721 N.W.2d 374.
110. Strand, ¶¶ 1, 2, 721 N.W.2d at 375.
111. Id. ¶ 1.
112. Id.
113. Id. ¶ 21, 721 N.W.2d at 380 (Maring, J., concurring).
114. Id. ¶ 2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. ¶ 3, 721 N.W.2d at 375-76.
118. Id. at 376.
119. Id.
120. Id.; “[I]f the project constitutes an extraordinary expenditure, Cass County cannot
commence the project prior to submitting the proposed expenditure to a vote. Whether the
demolition is a separate project from the proposed construction is a question of fact on which this
office cannot opine.” N.D. Op. Att’y. Gen. 2003-L-25, at 4.
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The County concluded the demolition was a separate project and did not
require voter approval.121
Strand filed a suit against the County on April 14, 2003, alleging that
under chapter 11-11, the County had an obligation to hold a vote before
continuing the demolition.122 The district court issued a restraining order
that was later vacated by stipulation of the parties on April 22, 2003,
because the buildings were already partially demolished.123 On May 6,
2003, the contractor submitted a bill to the County.124 The County filed its
answer and counterclaim on May 7, 2003, claiming Strand’s “allegations
[we]re untrue, made without reasonable cause and not in good faith and
[we]re frivolous” under section 28-26-31 of the North Dakota Century
Code.125 The County further claimed Strand’s actions, in delaying the
demolition, resulted in additional costs in excess of $39,000.126 Strand was
allowed to amend his complaint, so Strand added a request for attorney fees
on grounds that the County’s claims were frivolous and lacked good
faith.127 Strand further alleged that the County violated his civil rights
under the First Amendment, the North Dakota Constitution, and 42 U.S.C.
§1983.128
At trial, the jury found that the County did not violate Strand’s First
Amendment rights nor commit an abuse of process by asserting a
counterclaim.129 Additionally, the jury determined that Strand’s procurement of a restraining order had not damaged the County.130 Later, the
district court ruled that the County had not violated chapter 11-11 when it
failed to present the demolition project to a vote.131 Furthermore, the
district court denied Strand’s motion for attorney fees.132
Strand appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, alleging the
district court committed a reversible error by instructing the jury on his civil
rights claim.133 Strand claimed the district court’s instruction erroneously
“required the jury to find that a violation of his civil rights had to be the
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Strand, ¶ 3, 721 N.W.2d at 375-76.
Id. ¶ 4.
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result of a ‘policy or custom’ of the County, and the commissioners’
approval of the filing of the counterclaim indisputably constituted an
official ‘policy.’”134
The Supreme Court of North Dakota evaluated United States Supreme
Court precedent to determine whether local government may be sued under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries inflicted by its employees or agents.135 In
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,136 the United
States Supreme Court held that local governments cannot be sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries inflicted “solely” by employees or agents.137
Adopting this reasoning, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
plaintiffs, who attempt to file a claim against a municipality under § 1983,
must reference a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s
injury.138 The court also referenced Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,139
where the United States Supreme Court held that a local government, or
municipality, “may be liable . . . for a single decision by its properly constituted legislative body-whether or not that body had taken similar action
in the past . . . because even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official government policy.”140 Therefore, the
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in
denying Strand’s request to remove references to “policy or custom” from
the jury instruction because these words were appropriate in defining the
elements of a section 1983 violation.141
The court next addressed Strand’s claim for attorney fees.142 Strand
argued the district court should have granted his request for attorney fees
because the County’s demand for attorney fees was frivolous and lacked
good faith.143 Strand’s motion for attorney fees, presented under Rule 11(b)
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure and sections 28-26-01 and
28-26-31 of the North Dakota Century Code, had two bases.144 First, he
argued that the County’s counterclaim for $39,000 was frivolous and made
in bad faith.145 Second, he argued that the County’s claim for attorney fees
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Id. ¶ 8, 718 N.W.2d at 377.
Id. ¶ 10.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Strand, ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d at 377 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
Id. at 377-78.
475 U.S. 469 (1986).
Strand, ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480).
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 15, 721 N.W.2d at 379.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id.
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was frivolous and made in bad faith.146 At trial, the district court denied the
motion for attorney fees, but ruled only on the first basis.147
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that under Rule 11 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure and sections 28-26-01 and 28-26-31 of
the North Dakota Century Code, an award of attorney fees lies within the
discretion of the district court.148 But a district court “abuses its discretion
when it fails to address nonfrivolous issues.”149 Therefore, the North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the
case so the district court could consider Strand’s second basis for requesting
attorney fees.150
Justice Maring concurred.151 Justice Maring voiced her concerns about
attorneys making misstatements of the law during closing argument.152
Specifically, she stated that attorneys who make improper statements during
closing argument should be admonished because “the legal system depends
on public confidence in the courts and the system of justice is negatively
impacted by the allowance of improper comments.”153
COMMERCIAL LAW—BILLS AND NOTES—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON
ENDORSEMENT OR TRANSFER
STATE EX REL. V. CENTER MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
Center Mutual Insurance Company (Center Mutual) appealed a district
court judgment finding Center Mutual liable to the North Dakota Housing
Finance Agency (NDHFA) for a forged insurance proceeds check.154 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment, concluding that Center Mutual was not discharged on the forged check, and
therefore, was liable to NDHFA for the amount of the check.155
Brian and Penny Grieme purchased a house in Mandan, North Dakota,
financing it with a first-time home buyer loan through Bank Center First.156

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 17, 721 N.W.2d at 379-80; see generally Dietz v. Kautzman, 2004 ND 119, 681
N.W.2d 437; Peterson v. Zerr, 477 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1991).
149. Strand, ¶ 17, 721 N.W.2d at 380 (citing Hilgers v. Hilgers, 2004 ND 95, ¶ 25, 679
N.W.2d 447).
150. Id.
151. Id. ¶ 21 (Maring, J., concurring).
152. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
153. Id. ¶ 27-28, 721 N.W.2d at 381.
154. State ex rel. v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 2006 ND 175, ¶ 1, 720 N.W.2d 425, 426.
155. Id.
156. Id. ¶ 2.
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The Griemes executed a mortgage on the house in favor of the Bank. 157
Bank Center First assigned the mortgage to the NDHFA, but continued to
act as the participating lender for the NDHFA in financing and servicing the
Griemes’ mortgage obligation.158 The Griemes’ mortgage obligation was
financed through revenue bonds, which were held in trust by Norwest Bank
of Minnesota (Norwest Bank).159
The mortgage required the Griemes to insure the home, so the
Griemes’ obtained a dwelling insurance policy from Center Mutual.160 The
insurance documents named the Griemes as the insured and Norwest Bank
and NDHFA as the loss payees.161 The insurance premium billing notices
were mailed for payment to Norwest Bank and NDHFA, in care of Bank
Center First.162
The Griemes’ house was damaged by a hailstorm in 2001.163 A claims
adjuster for Center Mutual inspected the property and determined that the
house received $4378.00 worth of damage, after adjusting for the $500.00
deductible.164 On July 13, 2001, Center Mutual issued a check drawn on
Bremer Bank, N.A., in the amount of $4378.00 made jointly payable to
“Brian D. Grieme & Norwest Bank of MN & ND Housing Finance” to
cover the insurable loss.165 Center Mutual mailed the insurance check to
Brian Grieme, at his address in the State of Arizona.166
Grieme presented the check for payment to Wells Fargo Bank of
Tempe, bearing endorsements in the form of a signature purporting to be
that of Brian Grieme, and the handwritten block-printing “Norwest Bank”
and “ND Housing Finance.”167 The endorsement purporting to be that of
the NDHFA was forged.168 The check was processed for payment and paid
by Bremer Bank from Center Mutual’s bank account, and the cancelled
insurance check was returned to Center Mutual.169
In November 2001, Bank Center First requested a copy of the cancelled
insurance check from Center Mutual.170 Then, Bank Center First informed
157.
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Center Mutual that the check had a forged endorsement.171 While Center
Mutual and Bremer Bank were considering whether to issue a substitute
insurance check, the Griemes cancelled their insurance policy with Center
Mutual and filed bankruptcy in the State of Arizona under chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code.172 Center Mutual and Bremer Bank ultimately refused to
pay NDHFA.173
NDHFA sued Center Mutual for $4378, alleging that Center Mutual
breached the terms of the insurance policy and mortgage and that Center
Mutual was liable to NDHFA on the forged check.174 The district court
found that Center Mutual did not breach the insurance contract or
mortgage.175 But the district court determined that Center Mutual should
have sought reimbursement for the forged check through the banks that had
accepted the forged endorsement.176 Therefore, the district court held that
Center Mutual was liable to NDHFA for the amount of the forged check.177
Center Mutual appealed, alleging that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment awarding $4378 plus interest to NDHFA.178
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Center Mutual argued
that it owed no specific statutory duty to NDHFA to discover the forged
endorsement.179 The issue on appeal was “whether a joint payee whose
endorsement was forged on an instrument has an action on the instrument
against the drawer.”180 Here, the concern was whether Center Mutual’s
obligation was discharged when Bremer Bank accepted the forged check
and charged it against Center Mutual’s account.181
The court looked to other jurisdictions regarding a drawer’s liability to
a non-alternative joint payee whose endorsement was forged on an

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. ¶ 7.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 10.
180. Id.
181. Id. ¶ 13, 720 N.W.2d at 428. Section 41-03-10(4) of the North Dakota Century Code
[U.C.C. § 3-110] governs the rights of multiple payees on an instrument. N.D. CENT. CODE § 4103-10(4) (2005). The statute provides:
If an instrument is payable to two or more persons alternatively, it is payable to any of
them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced by any or all of them in
possession of the instrument. If an instrument is payable to two or more persons not
alternatively, it is payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or
enforced only by all of them.
Id.
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instrument because this case was of first impression in North Dakota.182
Other jurisdictions have held that the drawer of a check is not discharged on
the instrument and is liable to the joint payee.183 The court noted that under
the Uniform Commercial Code, a forgery does not have the effect of a valid
signature, nor does it pass title to the paper or release the obligor on the
paper from the obligation to pay the payee.184
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that Center Mutual was liable to
NDHFA on the instrument because the forged endorsement of NDHFA on
the check did not operate as its signature.185 Therefore, under section 4103-10(4) of the North Dakota Century Code, the forgery did not discharge
Center Mutual as the drawer of the instrument.186
Additionally, the court stated that Center Mutual, when notified of the
forged endorsement, could have demanded reimbursement from Bremer
Bank.187 Bremer Bank could have sought reimbursement up through the
chain of collecting banks until it reached Wells Fargo Bank of Tempe, the
depository bank.188
Ultimately, the Uniform Commercial Code creates liability for the
forged on the party who accepted the check from the forger, or on the forger
himself.189 The Uniform Commercial Code does not require the innocent
loss payee, whose endorsement was forged, to directly sue the forger or the
depository bank.190 Therefore, the court held that the district court did not
err in determining that Center Mutual was liable on the instrument to
NDHFA.191
Next, the court evaluated the amount of damages to which NDHFA
was entitled.192 Center Mutual argued that NDHFA was entitled to an
amount less than $4378, the amount of the check, because NDHFA repaired
the Griemes’ house at a lower cost.193 Central Mutual relied on section 32-

182. Id. ¶ 16, 720 N.W.2d at 428-29.
183. Id.
184. Id. ¶ 17, 720 N.W.2d at 429 (citing 6 RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-404:34 (3d ed. 1998)).
185. Id. ¶ 21, 720 N.W.2d at 431.
186. Id.
187. Id. ¶ 22, 720 N.W.2d at 431-32; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-04-32(1) (2005)
(permitting a bank to charge an item that is properly payable against its customer).
188. Id. ¶ 22, 720 N.W.2d at 431-32.
189. Id. at 432.
190. Id.
191. Id. ¶ 23.
192. Id. ¶ 24.
193. Id.
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03-09.1 of the North Dakota Century Code to advance its argument that
NDHFA was entitled to a lesser amount of damages.194
However, the court disagreed, finding that section 32-03-09.1 applies
to damages for injury to property that resulted from the breach of an
obligation not arising from a contract.195 In this case, Center Mutual’s liability to NDHFA, was based upon the instrument itself, and not upon injury
to property, so the court found that section 32-03-09.1 did not apply.196
Therefore, the court held that a negotiable instrument, including a check, is
an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount of money, so the proper
measure of damages is the face amount of the check.197 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment.198
COURTS—ISSUANCE OF REMEDIAL WRITS
TRINITY HOSPITALS V. MATTSON
In Trinity Hospitals v. Mattson,199 Trinity Hospitals, a non-profit corporation, sought a writ to vacate a district court order that denied Trinity
Hospitals summary judgment, and to dismiss a wrongful death action
brought by the personal representative of Eleanor Neiss’s estate.200 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that Trinity Hospitals is immune from
suit under the exclusive remedy provisions of workers’ compensation law
and directed the district court to dismiss the action.201
The wrongful death action alleged that Neiss was employed by Trinity
Health, a North Dakota non-profit corporation, and that she injured herself
at work.202 Specifically, the complaint alleged that while she was walking
in a service tunnel, owned by Trinity Hospitals, which connected Trinity
Hospital St. Joseph’s with the Health Center Medical Arts building in
Minot, Neiss fell and hit her head.203 As a result of the fall, Neiss suffered
serious injuries that led to her death.204 At the time of Neiss’s fall, other
194. Id. This statute provides in part, “The measure of damages for injury to property caused
by the breach of an obligation not arising from contract . . . is presumed to be the reasonable cost
of repairs . . . and the reasonable value of the loss of use pending restoration of the property . . . .”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-09.1 (2005).
195. Central, ¶ 25, 720 N.W.2d at 432.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. ¶ 26.
199. 2006 ND 231, 723 N.W.2d 684.
200. Trinity, ¶ 1, 723 N.W.2d at 685.
201. Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 723 N.W.2d at 693.
202. Id. ¶ 2, 723 N.W.2d at 685-86.
203. Id. at 685.
204. Id. at 685-66.
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Trinity Health employees were stripping and waxing the floor of the service
tunnel.205 Neiss had been assigned to clean the second floor of the Medical
Arts building, and used the service tunnel to walk from the cafeteria in
Trinity Hospital St. Joseph’s to the Medical Arts building.206 Trinity
Hospitals was responsible to maintain the skywalk and service tunnel
access, due to an easement that it had with Trinity Health.207 Therefore,
Laura Phillips, the personal representative of Neiss’s estate, brought a suit
against Trinity Hospitals for negligently maintaining the tunnel and failing
to take appropriate safety precautions in preventing injuries to those using
the tunnel.208 Trinity Hospitals moved for summary judgment, asserting:
(1) Neiss’s surviving spouse had received Workforce Safety and Insurance
(WSI) benefits through Trinity Health; and (2) workers’ compensation law
prevented Phillips from suing Trinity Hospitals because Trinity Health and
Trinity Hospitals were the same entity.209
Trinity Hospitals presented extensive evidence that it was part of
Trinity Health, an integrated healthcare system consisting of four non-profit
corporations.210 Specifically, Trinity Hospitals provided evidence that
Trinity Health was governed by a single board of directors and operated by
a single administrative team; Trinity Health controlled all operations of the
four corporations; and only one entity, “Trinity Health and Affiliates,” filed
a tax return that included the revenues and expenses for the four corporations.211 Since Trinity Health paid the WSI premiums for all employees in
the healthcare system, WSI determined that Trinity Hospitals and Trinity
Health were one entity for the purpose of WSI coverage.212
The district court denied Trinity Hospitals’ motion for summary judgment, determining that Trinity Hospitals and Trinity Health were not the
same entity for purposes of the exclusive remedy provisions under workers’
compensation law.213 Trinity Hospitals petitioned the North Dakota
Supreme Court for a supervisory writ to direct the district court to vacate its
denial of Trinity Hospitals’ summary judgment motion and to dismiss

205. Id. at 686.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. ¶ 3.
210. Id. The four non-profit corporations of Trinity Health are Trinity Hospitals, Trinity
Homes, Trinity Kenmare Hospital, and Trinity Health Foundation. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. ¶ 4, 723 N.W.2d at 686-87. The district court determined that Trinity Health and
Trinity Hospitals were separate entities upon analyzing Michigan case law under a parent and
subsidiary analysis. Id.
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Phillips’ action.214 Phillips argued that the district court did not err in
denying Trinity Hospitals’ summary judgment motion because Trinity
Hospitals was not immune from suit.215
After finding that this case appropriately invoked its supervisory jurisdiction, the North Dakota Supreme Court summarized the workers’
compensation exclusive remedy provisions.216 The court noted that these
provisions clearly precluded an injured employee from bringing an action
against a “contributing employer.”217 The court found that a “contributing
employer” is responsible for securing workers’ compensation coverage for
the employee, and then is immune from legal liability to the employee.218
The court concluded that Trinity Health was a “contributing employer”
under workers’ compensation law.219
To evaluate whether Trinity Health and Trinity Hospitals were one
entity, the court applied the “control” and the “economic realities” tests.220
Under the “economic reality” test, the court determined that the use of
combined workers’ compensation premiums for related corporations was an
important factor in categorizing an employee-employer relationship.221 The
court noted that this factor was particularly relevant in North Dakota
because workers’ compensation law specifically precluded an injured employee from suing a “contributing employer.”222 Therefore, the court found
that WSI’s determination that “all Trinity corporations fall under one
account” was an important factor to determining whether Trinity Hospitals
and Trinity Health were one entity.223 But the court also applied the

214. Id. ¶ 5, 723 N.W.2d at 687.
215. Id.
216. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 723 N.W.2d at 687-89. The court noted that supervisory writs are issued
only in extraordinary circumstances, where no other remedy exists. Id. ¶ 6, 723 N.W.2d at 687.
The Court found this case to be appropriate for issuing a supervisory writ because the case
involved an important public interest in the workers’ compensation immunity provisions. Id. ¶ 8,
723 N.W.2d at 687.
217. Id. ¶ 12, 723 N.W.2d at 689 (citing Cervantes v. Drayton Foods, L.L.C., 1998 ND 138,
¶ 9, 582 N.W.2d 2, 4).
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶ 13.
220. Id. ¶ 20, 723 N.W.2d at 692.
221. Id. ¶ 19, 723 N.W.2d at 691. The court followed Michigan case law, James v.
Commercial Carriers, Inc., 583 N.W.2d 913, 916, to evaluate the employer-employee relationship
in the parent-subsidiary context of a combined workers’ compensation policy by both parent and
subsidiary. Trinity, ¶ 19, 723 N.W.2d at 691. The James court applied the factors of the
“economic reality” test to determine whether parent and subsidiary corporations are one entity: (1)
control over workers’ duties; (2) payment of wages; (3) right to discipline, fire, and hire
employees; and (4) the performance of duties to accomplish one end goal. Trinity, ¶ 14, 18, 723
N.W.2d at 689, 691 (citing James, 583 N.W.2d at 915-19).
222. Id. ¶ 19, 723 N.W.2d at 691.
223. Id. at 692.
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“control” test to determine that Trinity Health and Trinity Hospitals were
the same entity.224 Under the “control” test, Trinity Health maintained
control because it was responsible for payroll; provided the only Human
Resources Department; provided the only board of directors; and employed
the director of plant operations, who was in charge of the repairs,
maintenance, and housekeeping for the property of all four corporations.225
Therefore, under both the “control” and the “economic reality” tests,
the court held that Trinity Hospitals was the same entity as Trinity Health
for WSI purposes, and that the exclusive remedy provision applied to
Trinity Hospitals as a “contributing employer.”226 The court noted that
holding otherwise would allow WSI to collect a premium for all Trinity
Health employees but would only provide coverage for those employees
that were on Trinity Health’s property while performing work for Trinity
Health.227 Consequently, the North Dakota Supreme Court exercised its
jurisdiction to issue a supervisory writ to direct the district court to vacate
the order that denied Trinity Hospitals’ summary judgment motion and to
dismiss Phillips’ action.228

CRIMINAL LAW—INVESTIGATORY STOPS—MOTOR VEHICLE
GABEL V. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In Gabel v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,229 the North
Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment
that reversed a hearing officer’s decision to suspend Jay Gabel’s driver’s
license for ninety-one days.230 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the district court’s judgment, finding that the police stopped Gabel’s vehicle
without reasonable and articulable suspicion.231 Justice Sandstrom wrote a
dissenting opinion.232
On April 23, 2005, Chad Steele was traveling south of Jamestown
when he came upon a vehicle with the license plate “JAYBIRD,” driven by
Gabel.233 The vehicle sped up and slowed down, which prevented Steele
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. ¶ 20.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 20-21.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 22, 723 N.W. 2d at 693.
2006 ND 178, 720 N.W.2d 433.
Gabel, ¶ 1, 720 N.W.2d at 434.
Id. ¶ 16, 720 N.W.2d at 438.
Id. ¶ 18 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 2, 720 N.W.2d at 434.
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from passing the vehicle.234 Steele reported the vehicle to the Stutsman
County Sheriff’s Office and followed the driver while speaking to the dispatcher.235 The dispatcher reported Steele’s information to Officer Kapp,
who passed Steele’s vehicle and found Gabel’s vehicle.236 Officer Kapp
stopped Gabel’s vehicle because of the information that she had received
from dispatch.237 Officer Kapp did not notice any suspicious or erratic
behavior in Gabel’s driving before stopping him.238 When stopped, Gabel
admitted to drinking and subsequently failed field sobriety tests that Officer
Kapp administered.239 Therefore, Officer Kapp arrested Gabel for driving
under the influence.240
At the administrative hearing, Gabel argued that under Anderson v.
Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation,241 the officer
“lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.”242
The hearing officer distinguished Anderson because here Officer Kapp
knew the informant, and therefore the hearing officer suspended Gabel’s
license.243 On appeal, the district court reversed the prior decision, finding
that the arresting officer did not have an independent basis to make the
traffic stop.244 The North Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT)
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court to determine whether
Anderson is distinguishable.245 The court reviewed the decision to suspend
the driver’s license according to chapters 28 through 32 of the North
Dakota Century Code.246
In order to justify an investigatory stop of a moving vehicle, “an officer
must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion the motorist has violated
or is violating the law.”247 Reasonable and articulable suspicion is
evaluated under a totality of the circumstances by applying an objective

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. ¶ 2-3.
237. Id. ¶ 3.
238. Id.
239. Id. ¶ 4.
240. Id.
241. 2005 ND 97, 696 N.W.2d 918
242. Gabel, ¶ 5, 720 N.W.2d. at 434 (citing Anderson, ¶ 21, 696 N.W.2d at 923 (finding that
an informant who merely reports the behavior of a “possible reckless driver or drunk driver” is not
sufficient to provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion for an officer to stop an individual’s
vehicle)).
243. Gabel, ¶ 5, 720 N.W.2d. at 435.
244. Id. ¶ 6.
245. Id.
246. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Anderson, ¶ 6, 696 N.W. at 918).
247. Id. ¶ 9 (citing City of Fargo v. Ovind, 1998 ND 69, ¶ 8, 575 N.W.2d 901, 903).
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standard.248 A known informant’s tip is one way to provide a sufficient
basis to justify a stop.249 The general rule on tips is that “the lesser the
quality or reliability of the tip, the greater the quantity of information required to raise a reasonable suspicion.”250 Officer Kapp knew the informant only through his criminal record, as a “criminal milieu;” therefore, the
court stated that the informant’s reliability generally would have to be
established.251 The court found that a determination of the informant’s
reliability was unnecessary here because a tip that Gabel was driving
slightly below the posted speed limit was insufficient to support a traffic
stop, without additional evidence of otherwise illegal activity or suspicious
conduct.252
The DOT argued that the tip against Gabel was stronger than in
Anderson.253 The DOT believed that the tip provided Officer Kapp with
evidence that Gabel committed a traffic violation, rather than the possibility
of committing a violation as in Anderson.254 The court disagreed, and
stated that the tip showed only a possibility that Gabel committed a violation, which the court found to be the “functional equivalent of the ‘possible
reckless driver or drunk driver’ held to be insufficient” in Anderson.255
Thus, the court affirmed the district court decision, concluding that Officer
Kapp lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify stopping
Gabel’s vehicle.256
Justice Sandstrom wrote a dissenting opinion to assert that Gabel’s stop
was justified because Officer Kapp’s tip was reliable and specific.257 As an
initial matter, Justice Sandstrom believed that the majority misstated the
standard of review in administrative appeals.258 He noted that the court
should review an administrative agency’s findings based on whether a
“reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire
record.”259
248. Id. at 436 (citing Ovind, ¶ 8, 575 N.W.2d at 903).
249. Id. ¶ 11.
250. Id. ¶12, 720 N.W.2d at 436-37 (citing State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640-41 (N.D.
1994)).
251. Id. at 437.
252. Id.
253. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 720 N.W.2d at 436, 437.
254. Id. ¶ 13, 720 N.W.2d at 437.
255. Id. ¶ 15, 720 N.W.2d at 438 (quoting Anderson, v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., ¶ 21,
696 N.W.2d 918, 923) (internal quotations omitted).
256. Id. ¶ 16.
257. Id. ¶ 18 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
258. Id. ¶ 19.
259. Id. at 439.
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Justice Sandstrom disagreed with the majority’s differentiation
between a “criminal milieu” and a citizen informant.260 The majority implied that Steele was a member of the criminal milieu; therefore, it stated
that Steele’s information had to be validated to establish reliability.261
Justice Sandstrom stated, “[t]he majority has basically categorized all informants with a criminal past into the ‘criminal milieu’ without consideration
of what the criminal past is or how that past is relevant to the case at
hand.”262 He argued that corroboration was not required in this case, because the tip came from a known citizen informant that provided sufficient
information to give the officer reasonable and articulable suspicion.263
Additionally, Justice Sandstrom asserted that Anderson is distinguishable.264 Justice Sandstrom found that in this case, unlike in Anderson, the
informant provided specific information to dispatch and was available for
questioning to establish reliability.265 Furthermore, Justice Sandstrom
stated that an officer need not find every element of a violation to be met
before reasonable and articulable suspicion is established.266 Ultimately,
Justice Sandstrom concluded that the informant’s tip provided Officer Kapp
with sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to make the traffic
stop.267 Thus, Justice Sandstrom would have reversed the district court’s
decision.268

CRIMINAL LAW—AUTOMOBILES—ARREST, STOP, AND INQUIRY
STATE V. OLIVER
Kenneth Wayne Oliver appealed a conditional plea of guilty for: (1)
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; (2) possession of
drug paraphernalia (methamphetamine); (3) driving under suspension; and,
(4) fleeing a police officer.269 The district court denied his motion to
suppress evidence that was found on him and in his car.270 Oliver appealed

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
Id. ¶ 23, 720 N.W.2d at 440.
Id.
Id. ¶ 26, 720 N.W.2d at 441.
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 442.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 28.
State v. Oliver, 2006 ND 241, ¶ 1, 724 N.W.2d 114, 115.
Id.
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to the North Dakota Supreme Court to reverse the denial of his motion.271
On appeal, he argued that the evidence was unconstitutionally seized due to
a pretextual stop.272 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the district court because the stop of Oliver’s vehicle was not
unconstitutional.273
On July 6, 2005, an undercover narcotics task force detective received
information from an informant indicating suspicious activity involving a
hand-to-hand exchange at a local car wash/laundromat.274 The detective
surveilled the location and observed Oliver, but she did not see any drugrelated activity.275 However, the detective noticed that Oliver’s vehicle
lacked license plates and had a temporary registration sticker that she
perceived to be faded and illegible.276 The detective testified that she would
have stopped Oliver’s vehicle to validate the registration, if she would have
been driving a marked police car.277 She contacted uniformed patrol
officers with information about Oliver’s vehicle and its direction of travel,
and informed the officers that they would have to decide whether to stop
Oliver’s vehicle.278
Officer Donald Beck responded to the detective’s call, followed
Oliver’s vehicle, and noticed that the vehicle lacked license plates.279
Additionally, Officer Beck observed what he perceived to be a faded thirty
day temporary registration sticker on the rear window of Oliver’s car.280
Officer Beck flashed his lights to initiate a stop of Oliver’s vehicle because
he was unable to read the print of the registration sticker to determine its
validity.281 Instead of stopping his vehicle, Oliver drove into a nearby
parking lot.282 Then, Oliver fled into the store, even though Officer Beck
and another officer ordered him to stop.283 The officers seized Oliver in the
store’s restroom, where they discovered drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine.284 The police department’s K-9 unit performed an exterior
sweep of Oliver’s vehicle, and because the dog indicated a “hit,” the
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 724 N.W.2d at 117.
Id. ¶ 2, 724 N.W.2d at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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officers searched the interior of the vehicle.285 The officers discovered
methamphetamine and a scale inside Oliver’s vehicle.286 Therefore, the
officers arrested Oliver for fleeing a peace officer, possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia
(methamphetamine), and driving under suspension.287
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court had to determine whether
the district court properly denied Oliver’s suppression motion.288 Oliver
argued that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion
because the officers unconstitutionally stopped his vehicle on pretextual
grounds.289 On the other hand, the state argued that the officers constitutionally stopped Oliver’s vehicle on grounds that they had reasonable and
articulable suspicion to believe the vehicle’s temporary registration was
invalid.290 The state further argued that Officer Beck observed a traffic
violation, which permitted a lawful stop of the vehicle, regardless of
whether the stop was pretextual or not.291
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of people to be “secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”292 Even temporary detentions of individuals, if actuated by the
police, constitute a seizure.293 However, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe a traffic
violation has occurred.”294 Further, the court explained that traffic violations, even if pretextual, provide a lawful basis to stop the vehicle for
investigative purposes, because the police officer’s subjective intentions in
making the stop are irrelevant so long as a traffic violation has occurred.295
Next, the court examined whether Oliver’s faded temporary registration gave Officer Beck the right to stop the vehicle.296 Officer Beck
observed that Oliver’s vehicle lacked license plates, which was in possible
violation of North Dakota vehicle registration provisions.297 Section 39-0417 of the North Dakota Century Code permits a temporary registration

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 6 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV, and N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8).
Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)).
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Loh, 2000 ND 188, ¶ 10, 618 N.W.2d 477).
Id. ¶ 7, 724 N.W.2d at 117.
Id.
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sticker to be displayed on a vehicle while a title application is being
processed.298 This temporary registration remains valid for thirty days from
the date of application.299 The court concluded that Officer Beck had a
right to stop Oliver’s vehicle because the temporary registration was faded
and had no visible writing, which was indicative of the registration being
older than thirty days.300
The court concluded this by relying on Kennedy v. State,301 where
officers had followed a car but could not determine the tag’s issue date.302
The officers stopped the vehicle because they thought the tag was no longer
valid, and the officers then arrested the driver for drug possession.303 Like
Oliver, this driver argued that displaying a faded tag was not a violation,
meaning that the officers did not have a legal basis to stop the vehicle. 304
The Texas court disagreed holding,
[T]he faded dealers tag gave the officers reasonable suspicion to
believe that a violation had occurred, that Appellant was driving an
unregistered car. Appellant was not stopped because the faded tag
was a violation, but rather, under the circumstances, it was an
indication that a violation had been, and was, occurring.305
Applying Kennedy, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that
Oliver’s constitutional rights were not violated when the officers stopped
his vehicle, and consequently the searches were valid incident to arrest.306
Therefore, the court held that the district court properly denied Oliver’s
suppression motion.307

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-04-17).
Id.
Id.
847 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App. 1993).
Oliver, ¶ 9, 724 N.W.2d at 117 (citing Kennedy, 847 S.W.2d at 635).
Id. (citing Kennedy, 847 S.W.2d at 635).
Id. (citing Kennedy, 847 S.W.2d at 636).
Id. (quoting Kennedy v. State, 847 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Tex. App. 1993)).
Id. ¶ 10-11.
Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW—INVESTIGATORY STOP—MOTOR VEHICLES
JOHNSON V. SPRYNCZYNATYK
In Johnson v. Sprynczynatyk,308 Robert Johnson was arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol, and his driving privileges were
suspended at an administrative hearing.309 Johnson appealed the administrative officer’s decision to a district court, and the district court reversed
the suspension.310 The North Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT)
appealed the district court decision, and requested the reinstatement of the
administrative officer’s decision.311 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s decision, and held that the arresting officer
lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Johnson’s vehicle.312
Justice Sandstrom wrote a dissenting opinion.313
At 12:43 a.m. on August 30, 2005, a police officer stopped Johnson’s
vehicle for driving eight to ten miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour
zone.314 The officer testified at the administrative hearing that he followed
Johnson for two blocks, and observed no other form of erratic driving, or
other suspicious behavior, before stopping the vehicle.315 Once he approached the car, he detected the odor of alcohol, whereupon he had
Johnson perform five field sobriety tests which Johnson failed.316 Based on
the officer’s observations and the results of the field sobriety tests, the
officer arrested Johnson.317
At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer determined that
traveling eight to ten miles per hour in a twenty-five miles per hour zone is
inordinately slow, constituting a reasonable and articulable basis to stop the
vehicle.318 The hearing officer suspended Mr. Johnson’s driver’s license
for ninety-one days.319 The district court reversed the hearing officer’s
decision and reinstated Johnson’s driving privileges, reasoning that the

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
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2006 ND 137, 717 N.W.2d 586.
Johnson, ¶ 1, 717 N.W.2d at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15, 717 N.W2d at 590.
Id. ¶ 17 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 2, 717 N.W.2d at 587.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 717 N.W.2d at 587-88.
Id. at 588.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.

2007]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

1115

driving conduct observed did not constitute a reasonable and articulable
basis in which to stop the vehicle.320
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court evaluated whether, under
the totality of the circumstances, Johnson’s driving constituted reasonable
and articulable suspicion.321 The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution grants police the right to temporarily detain an individual for
investigative purposes when the officer has a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.322 The court recognized three
common situations in which reasonable and articulable suspicion exist: “(1)
when the officer relied on a directive or request for action from another
officer; (2) when the officer received tips from other police officers or
informants, which were then corroborated by the officer’s own observations; and, (3) when the officer directly observed illegal activity.”323 Each
situation requires an objective manifestation of potential criminal activity; a
mere hunch or curiosity of the police is not enough to establish a reasonable
and articulable suspicion.324 The court noted that in North Dakota, traveling at slower-than-usual speeds is not in itself an indication of driving
under the influence of alcohol or of other illegal activity.325
The DOT argued that Johnson’s vehicle was impeding traffic under
section 39-09-09(1) of the North Dakota Century Code due to its slow
speed.326 In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that nowhere in the
arresting officer’s testimony did he indicate that Johnson’s driving was
impeding traffic.327 In support of its holding that no reasonable and
articulable suspicion existed, the court cited several North Dakota decisions
in which slow speed, time of night, and other subjective factors did not,
standing alone, provide the police with objective manifestations of potential
criminal activity justifying a stop.328 The court stated that there may be a
situation where a driver is traveling so slowly that the slow speed, in itself,
creates a reasonable and articulable suspicion of potential criminal activity;

320. Id. ¶ 5.
321. Id.
322. Id. ¶ 7 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968)).
323. Id. ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d at 588-89.
324. Id. ¶ 9, 717 N.W.2d at 589.
325. Id.
326. Id. ¶ 10 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-09-09(1) (2005)). The statute provides: “No
person may drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable
movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance
with law.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-09-09(1) (2005).
327. Johnson, ¶ 12, 717 N.W.2d at 589.
328. Id. ¶¶ 12-14, 717 N.W.2d at 589-90 (citing State v. Robertsdahl, 512 N.W.2d 427, 428
(N.D. 1994); Salter v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111, 114 (N.D. 1993); State v. Brown,
509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D. 1993); State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284, 286 (N.D. 1992)).
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but the court held that Johnson’s driving did not meet this situation.329
Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s
decision.330
Justice Sandstrom wrote a dissenting opinion.331 He dissented from the
majority’s holding for two reasons.332 First, Justice Sandstrom argued that
the majority chose to disregard certain facts critical to the determination of
whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion existed.333 Second, he
argued that the facts considered by the majority did, under the totality of the
circumstances, constitute a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop
Johnson’s vehicle.334
Justice Sandstrom argued that the majority ignored facts based on the
officer’s testimony as to how far he followed Johnson’s vehicle.335 He
reasoned that, based on where the officer testified he first saw the vehicle,
versus where Johnson’s vehicle was actually stopped, the officer observed
the vehicle for five blocks, not two, as the majority stated.336
Next, Justice Sandstrom disputed the majority’s position that it is
common for individuals to drive under the speed limit in residential or
densely populated areas.337 He reasoned that the record did not reflect
evidence supporting this idea.338 Conversely, Justice Sandstrom argued that
it was unusual to observe a vehicle traveling so slowly at that hour of
night.339 He reiterated that two critical facts—the distance which the officer
followed Mr. Johnson’s vehicle and the unusualness of the slow speed at
that hour—were wrongly ignored by the majority.340
Additionally, Justice Sandstrom objected to the holding on grounds that
under the totality of the circumstances, the officer did have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle.341 He believed that the majority
made the mistake of asking whether actual criminal activity is observed.342
The law requires only a reasonable and articulable suspicion that potential
criminal activity is afoot before the officer may conduct an investigatory
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Johnson, ¶ 14, 717 N.W.2d at 590.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 17 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 22, 717 N.W.2d at 591.
Id. ¶19, 717 N.W.2d at 590-91.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20, 717 N.W.2d at 591.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 22.
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stop.343 Justice Sandstrom would have reversed the decision of the district
court and reinstated the decision of the administrative officer.344

CRIMINAL LAW—INVESTIGATORY STOP—MOTOR VEHICLES
STATE V. TORKELSEN
Steven Arthur Torkelsen appealed his conviction of class AA felony
murder.345 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the initial stop of
Torkelsen’s vehicle was illegal.346 Therefore, the court reversed and
remanded Torkelsen’s conditional plea.347 Justice Sandstrom wrote a dissenting opinion.348
On June 27, 2004, a farmer discovered the body of Rebecca Flaa
burning in a ditch east of Cando, North Dakota, in Towner County.349
Before authorities arrived, Torkelsen approached the farmer to determine if
the farmer needed assistance.350 The farmer knew Torkelsen and told him
to leave the area, and Torkelsen complied with the farmer’s request.351 As
emergency vehicles approached, Torkelsen did not move to the side of the
“narrow gravel road.”352
The farmer informed the authorities of
Torkelsen’s presence and that Torkelsen had not acknowledged the burning
body.353 Additionally, emergency personnel informed the investigators of
Torkelsen’s failure to move to the side of the road.354
Trooper LaRocque found Torkelsen driving near Wolford, North
Dakota.355 After following Torkelsen for several miles, LaRocque radioed
his supervisor and informed him that Torkelsen was not driving erratically
or violating any laws, and asked how to proceed.356 LaRocque was
instructed to stop Torkelsen, but only after backup officers were in the
area.357 LaRocque stopped Torkelsen, handcuffed him, and informed
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
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354.
355.
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Id.
Id. ¶ 29, 717 N.W.2d at 593.
State v. Torkelsen, 2006 ND 152, ¶ 1, 718 N.W.2d 22, 24.
Id. ¶ 17, 718 N.W.2d at 28.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 20 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶¶ 2, 6, 718 N.W.2d at 24, 25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.

1118

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:1085

Torkelsen that he was wanted for questioning in Cando.358 Torkelsen was
transported twenty-eight miles to the Towner County Sheriff’s office,
where he was given his Miranda rights and questioned.359 He allegedly
consented to the search of his vehicle and trailer that revealed incriminating
evidence.360 Torkelsen was then formally arrested and transported to the
Lake Region Correctional Center.361
Before trial, Torkelsen moved to dismiss or suppress the evidence
discovered during the search, arguing that the evidence found should be
excluded because the law enforcement officers lacked a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that Torkelsen committed a traffic violation.362 The
district court denied the motion, ruling the initial stop of Torkelsen’s
vehicle was valid because the articulable suspicion was based on the
suspicion that Torkelsen committed a homicide, not on the suspicion that he
committed a traffic violation.363 Torkelsen argued that he was arrested at
the time of the initial stop because the officers placed him in handcuffs
while he was transported to the Sheriff’s office in Cando.364 The district
court ruled that while the actions of the officers may have constituted a
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, “the seizure was reasonable given
the ‘safety and security interests involved with [the] serious nature of the
crime charged and the fact that [Torkelsen] was seen leaving the place
where the body was found.’”365 Consequently, Torkelsen entered an Alford
conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to fifty years in prison, with thirty
years suspended.366
The North Dakota Supreme Court first discussed the permissible types
of law enforcement-citizen encounters.367 According to the court, there are
three types: (1) “arrests which must be supported by probable cause; (2)
Terry stops, seizures which must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) community caretaking encounters, which do not constitute Fourth Amendment seizures.”368 Because the

358. Id. ¶ 5, 718 N.W.2d at 25.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. ¶¶ 6-9.
363. Id. ¶ 9.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. ¶ 6; see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (permitting a defendant
to accept a plea whereby he professes innocence as to committing the crime, but states that
sufficient evidence exists to finding guilt).
367. Torkelsen, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 26.
368. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (citations omitted)).
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state did not argue, and the lower court did not find, that the first or the
third of these permissible types are applicable in this case, the supreme
court reasoned that the issue was “whether law enforcement officers had a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that Torkelsen had engaged in criminal
activity to justify a Terry stop.”369
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that under Terry v. Ohio, 370
where there is no probable cause to make an arrest because an officer lacks
a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may
detain individuals for investigative purposes in appropriate circumstances.371 The court explained that an officer possesses reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle: “(1) when the officer relied on an appropriate
directive or request for action from another officer; (2) when the officer
received tips from police officers or informants, which were then
corroborated by the officer’s own observations; or (3) when the officer
directly observed illegal activity.”372
In this case, LaRocque did not observe Torkelsen engaging in any
illegal activity and did not corroborate a tip that Torkelsen had been
swerving all over the road.373 Although, when an officer relays an order or
request to another, without providing the essential facts and circumstances
giving rise to the order, the knowledge of the officer giving the order is
imputed to the receiving officer.374
The court identified the issue as whether the supervisor’s order to pull
Torkelsen over “was supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that Torkelsen had engaged in criminal activity.”375 The court used an
objective standard under the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified in
concluding that Torkelsen was engaging in unlawful activity, sufficient to
make an investigative stop.376 Even though Torkelsen was at the scene of
the crime before police arrived, his “presence at or near the scene of a
crime, without more, does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of

369. Id.; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (stating that the Fourth Amendment provides law
enforcement officers with the authority to conduct a reasonable search for weapons on an
individual when the officer has reason to believe that the individual is armed, and such authority is
permitted even when the officer does not have probable cause to arrest the individual).
370. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
371. Torkelsen, ¶ 11, 718 N.W.2d at 26.
372. Id.
373. Id. ¶ 12
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. ¶ 13.
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criminal activity.”377 Accordingly, the court held, Torkelsen’s status as a
resident of the area where the body was found, his stopping at the scene of
the crime to offer assistance, and his failure to yield to emergency vehicles
on a “narrow gravel road” were insufficient reasons to justify the investigative stop.378 The stop of Torkelsen’s vehicle was invalid because the
officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that he had engaged in
criminal activity.379
Justice Sandstrom wrote a dissenting opinion.380 In his dissent, Justice
Sandstrom stated the majority misapplied the law “parsing the facts rather
than taking them as a whole.”381 Justice Sandstrom examined each suspicious fact and concluded that, examined together, the factors provided the
officer with a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop to
question Torkelsen about the crime.382

CRIMINAL LAW—JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS—DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
INTEREST OF R.W.S.
R.W.S (Richard)383 appealed a juvenile court order, which determined
him to be a delinquent child and placed him with the North Dakota Division
of Juvenile Services for a temporary period of time.384 Richard argued that
his due process rights were violated because he was forced to wear handcuffs during his juvenile court hearing.385 Specifically, he argued that incourt identifications of him while wearing handcuffs were impermissibly
suggestive and unreliable; therefore, he was denied a fair hearing.386 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that Richard’s due process rights were
not violated, because the in-court identifications did not result in a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.387 The court determined that

377. Id. ¶ 15, 718 N.W. 2d at 27; see generally State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah. App.
1992); City of Fargo v. Wonder, 2002 ND 142, 651 N.W.2d 655.
378. Id. ¶ 16.
379. Id. ¶ 17, 718 N.W.2d at 28.
380. Id. ¶ 20 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
381. Id.
382. Id. ¶ 37, 718 N.W.2d at 31.
383. Pseudonym used to protect the identity of the juvenile party.
384. In re R.W.S., 2007 ND 37, ¶ 1, 728 N.W.2d 326, 327.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. ¶ 36, 728 N.W.2d at 336.
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the juvenile court erred when it failed to independently decide whether to
remove Richard’s handcuffs.388
On April 18, 2006, Richard attended a juvenile court hearing to
determine whether he was a delinquent child.389 Richard was brought into
the courtroom wearing handcuffs, and remained handcuffed throughout the
hearing.390 During the hearing, Richard asked the referee to remove the
handcuffs, but the referee responded, “Well, as I’ve been told by the presiding judge of the district that this is a matter to be determined by the
sheriff’s office since they’re responsible for security. And so I’ve been told
not to interfere with that decision.”391 At the hearing, Robert and Carol
Solberg testified to seeing an intruder steal tools from their shed.392
Additionally, the witnesses testified that their son detained the intruder until
the police arrived.393 The Solbergs identified Richard as the intruder and
their attorney stated, “I’d like the record to also reflect that [Richard] is the
only Native American male in this courtroom. He’s the only person in this
courtroom who’s currently in handcuffs.”394 The referee determined that
Richard was a delinquent child for committing the offenses of burglary,
robbery, and disorderly conduct; therefore, the referee placed Richard in the
custody of the North Dakota Juvenile Services for a temporary period of
time.395
Richard requested a review of the referee’s decision on grounds that he
was denied a fair hearing by being forced to wear handcuffs during the incourt identifications.396 The juvenile court affirmed the referee’s order
because Richard had not proved that he was prejudiced during the in-court
identifications, and the juvenile court determined that the in-court identifications were supported by the evidence.397
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court had to determine whether
juveniles or adult defendants are entitled to appear in court free from
physical restraints.398 Since this was a case of first impression, the court
evaluated precedent from other jurisdictions, particularly United States

388.
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Supreme Court precedent.399 The North Dakota Supreme Court analyzed
Deck v. Missouri,400 which stands for the proposition that “a criminal
defendant has a right to remain free of physical restraints that are visible to
the jury; that the right has a constitutional dimension; but that the right may
be overcome in a particular instance by essential state interests such as
physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum.”401 In Deck,
the United States Supreme Court determined whether shackling a convicted
offender during sentencing violated the offender’s constitutional rights.402
The Deck court evaluated the constitutional rights of a defendant during
trial to ultimately determine a convicted offender’s rights at sentencing: (1)
a criminal defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty and the sight
of restraints on the defendant undermines that presumption; (2) a criminal
defendant is afforded the right to a meaningful defense and restraints may
interfere with the defendant’s ability to communicate with defense counsel;
and (3) the judicial process must be dignified, which includes respectful
treatment of defendants.403 As a result, the Deck court concluded that physical restraints should not be used routinely on convicted offenders because
the offender is entitled to a meaningful offense and dignified court proceedings.404 Nevertheless, the offender’s right to be free from physical
restraints is not absolute.405
Based on the Deck’s holdings, the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that juveniles and adult defendants have the same right to be
free from physical restraints.406 The discretion to determine whether the
juvenile should be physically restrained lies with the juvenile court.407 The
court determined that a juvenile court should consider the following factors:
(1) “the accused’s record, temperament, and the desperateness of his
situation”; (2) “the security situation at the courtroom and courthouse”; (3)
“the accused’s physical condition”; and, (4) “whether there was an adequate
means of providing security that was less prejudicial.”408
Applying the factors to the present case, the court determined that
Richard’s due process rights were violated when he was forcibly restrained

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
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Id. ¶¶ 11-17, 728 N.W.2d at 329-31.
544 U.S. 622 (2005).
In re R.W.S., ¶ 11, 728 N.W.2d at 329 (quoting Deck, 544 U.S. at 628).
Id. ¶ 12 (citing Deck, 544 U.S. at 624).
Id. ¶ 13, 728 N.W.2d at 330 (citing Deck, 544 U.S. at 630-31).
Id. ¶ 14 (citing Deck, 544 U.S. at 632).
Id. ¶ 16 (citing Deck, 544 U.S. at 633).
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 17, 728 N.W.2d at 331.
Id. ¶ 18.
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in the juvenile hearing, but such violations were harmless error.409 The
referee did not produce evidence that Richard posed an immediate and
serious risk of danger, disruptive behavior, or flight, therefore, Richard
should not have been forcibly restrained.410 The court determined that such
violations of Richard’s rights were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the evidence in the record overwhelmingly supported the finding
that Richard was guilty of the charges brought against him.411
Next, Richard argued that he was denied a fair hearing because the incourt identifications took place while he was physically restrained.412 The
court analyzed precedent from other jurisdictions, as well as its own precedent, to define an accused’s constitutional rights during in-court identifications.413 In State v. Norrid,414 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that
due process of the accused is violated if, under a totality of the circumstances, the methods of the identification were so unnecessarily suggestive
as to create a substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identification.415
When such a violation occurs, the identification testimony must be suppressed.416 In order to determine whether there is a substantial likelihood of
irreparable mistaken identification, a court must apply five factors: (1)
“[t]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime”; (2) “the witness’ degree of attention”; (3) “the accuracy of his prior
description of the criminal”; (4) “the level of certainty demonstrated at the
confrontation”; and (5) “the time between the crime and the confrontation.”417
Applying the Norrid rule and the five reliability factors, the court
determined that the in-court identifications of Richard were suggestive.418
Because Richard was the only Native American in the courtroom and the
only individual in handcuffs, the in-court identifications were suggestive.419
The court found that under the Norrid rule and the five reliability factors,
the in-court identifications did not create a substantial likelihood of
409. Id. ¶ 19.
410. Id.
411. Id. ¶ 20, 728 N.W.2d at 331-32.
412. Id. ¶ 21, 728 N.W.2d at 332.
413. Id. ¶¶ 24-32, 728 N.W.2d at 332-35.
414. 2000 ND 112, 611 N.W.2d 866.
415. In re R.W.S., ¶¶ 26, 33, 728 N.W.2d at 333, 335 (citing Norrid, ¶ 8, 611 N.W.2d at
866).
416. Id. ¶ 26, 728 N.W.2d at 333.
417. Id. (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)); see also id. ¶ 33, 728
N.W.2d at 335 (stating that the five Biggers factors should be used in determining the reliability of
the identification).
418. Id. ¶ 34, 728 N.W.2d at 336.
419. Id.
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irreparable identification because the Solbergs had a clear view of Richard
as the intruder and Richard was personally detained by the Solbergs’ son
until the police arrived at the scene.420 Therefore, the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that the juvenile court violated Richard’s due
process rights by failing to make an independent determination of whether
Richard should be detained.421 Furthermore, the court determined that the
in-court identifications of Richard were not substantially likely to lead to
irreparable misidentification, so the juvenile court properly admitted the incourt identifications of Richard.422

CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT
STATE V. BUCHHOLZ
Paul Buchholz appealed his conviction of two counts of possession of a
firearm by a felon.423 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction.424
Buchholz was sentenced to sixty days in jail suspended and one year of
unsupervised probation, after being convicting of a class C felony for
issuing a check with insufficient funds.425 In November 2003, during a
search of Buchholz’s home under a valid search warrant, law enforcement
officers found an SKS rifle and shotgun under a bed.426 Buchholz was
charged with violating section 62.1-02-01(2) of the North Dakota Century
Code.427 At a preliminary hearing, the district court determined that there
was a lack of probable cause to find that Buchholz violated section 62.1-0201(2) because his class C felony conviction of issuing a check with
insufficient funds felony was immediately reduced to a misdemeanor at the
moment he was sentenced to a term less than one year.428
Following the appeal, Buchholz was charged with two additional
counts of felony possession of a firearm by a felon, based on weapons
officers seized as a result of a search of a residence and motor home.429

420. Id. ¶ 35.
421. Id. ¶ 37.
422. Id.
423. State v. Buchholz, 2006 ND 227, ¶ 1, 723 N.W.2d 534, 536.
424. Id.
425. Id. ¶ 2.
426. Id. ¶ 3.
427. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-01(2) (2005) (stating that persons convicted of
felonies are prohibited from possessing or owning a firearm).
428. Buchholz, ¶ 3, 723 N.W.2d 536-37.
429. Id. ¶ 5, 723 N.W.2d at 537.
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The state filed two motions in limine to exclude any testimony or evidence
that Buchholz relied on a mistake of law in owning or possessing
firearms.430 The district court granted the motions in limine, thereby disallowing Buchholz from presenting any testimony or evidence relating to a
mistake of law defense.431 The jury found Buchholz guilty of the initial
count of possession and one count of possession from the search of the
residence, but found him not guilty for the weapon that was seized from the
motor home.432
Buchholz claimed the district court abused its discretion by granting
the State’s motions in limine excluding evidence of his mistake of law
defense.433 Buchholz argued that in his prior appeal the court instructed the
district court to permit him to present evidence of a mistake of law defense
during trial.434 Furthermore, Buchholz asserted that the court’s instruction
is the “law of the case,” and therefore, the district court was required to
follow the instruction on remand.435 According to the “law of the case”
doctrine, “if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded
the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus
determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.”436
However, the court stated that the issue in Buchholz’s prior appeal was not
whether he could assert a mistake of law defense, but whether an affirmative defense could be properly asserted at a preliminary hearing.437 The
court held that an affirmative defense could not be asserted in a preliminary

430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. ¶ 6. The appropriate standard of review for a district court’s decision on a motion in
limine is abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 7. “A court has broad discretion in deciding whether evidence
is relevant, and this Court does not reverse a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence
on the basis of relevance unless the district court abused its discretion by acting in an arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.” Id. (quoting State v. Bjerklie, 2006 ND 173, ¶ 4, 719
N.W.2d 359, 361).
434. Id. ¶ 9; but see State v. Buchholz, 2005 ND 30, ¶ 8, 692 N.W.2d 105, 107 (finding that
Buchholz could not rely on a mistake of law defense at a preliminary hearing, and instead had to
prove an affirmative defense at trial). In the prior appeal, the court reversed and remanded a
district court order releasing Buchholz. Id. ¶ 12, 692 N.W.2d at 108. The court concluded that
any person convicted of a felony whose conviction is immediately reduced to a misdemeanor,
because the sentence is for less than one year, is still initially convicted of a felony. Id. ¶ 8, 692
N.W.2d at 107. But Buchholz claimed the district court’s discharge order should be upheld
because he did not believe he was committing a crime, and was therefore was mistaken about the
law. Id. ¶ 10.
435. Buchholz, ¶ 10, 723 N.W.2d at 538.
436. Id. (quoting Peoples State Bank of Truman, Inc. v. Molstad Excavating, Inc., 2006 ND
183, ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d 43, 46 (citations omitted)).
437. Id. ¶ 11.
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hearing because the purpose of a preliminary hearing is not to determine
guilt or innocence.438 “[T]herefore, the place for such an assertion [i]s at
trial.”439
Next, the court examined Buchholz’s mistake of law defense.440 The
court held that the defense is rarely available, and generally precluded,
when the offense lacks a culpability requirement such as the case of a strict
liability offense.441 The court held that an affirmative defense should not
apply because the offense of a felon in possession of a firearm is a strict
liability offense.442
After admitting that ignorance of the law is not an excuse, Buchholz
argued that the district court imposed an illegal sentence for the felony that
was the basis for his possession of firearms charge and that is a mistake of
law.443 The court explained that a sentence is illegal “if it is contrary to
statute, fails to comply with a promise of a plea bargain, or is inconsistent
with the oral pronouncement of the sentence.”444 Buchholz contended that
contrary to section 62.1-02-01(2) of the North Dakota Century Code, his
sentence only required that he not possess firearms for one year and the
sentence was illegal because the statute imposed a mandatory restriction of
at least five years.445
The court found Buchholz’s argument unpersuasive.446 If the district
court judge had informed Buchholz that section 62.1-02-01(2) did not apply
because his felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor, then
Buchholz may have been correct.447 The district court, however, had not
addressed whether section 62.1-02-01(2) applied to Buchholz.448 Instead,
the district court only addressed the conditions of Buchholz’s parole in
accordance with section 12.1-32-07(3) of the North Dakota Century
Code.449 The court concluded the district court’s sentence was not illegal

438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. ¶ 12.
441. Id. (citing State v. Eldred, 1997 ND 112, ¶¶ 29-31, 564 N.W.2d 283, 290-91).
442. Id.
443. Id. ¶ 13.
444. Id. (citing State v. Raulston, 2005 ND 212, ¶ 7, 707 N.W.2d 464, 467).
445. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-01(2) (2005) (stating that a person convicted of a
nonviolent felony is prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm for five years after conviction
or release from incarceration or probation, whichever is latest).
446. Buchholz, ¶ 15, 723 N.W.2d at 539-40.
447. Id. at 539.
448. Id.
449. Id. (“The court shall provide as an explicit condition of every probation that the
defendant may not possess a firearm. . . .” (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07(3) (2005)).

2007]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

1127

and the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence
concerning Buchholz’s mistake of law defense.450
Finally, Buchholz argued that because the State failed to present any
evidence that the firearms were capable of being fired, there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of being a felon in possession of a
firearm.451 But the sheriff’s deputy testified that he believed the guns were
capable of being firing and Buchholz did not present any evidence or
testimony to rebut the testimony.452 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
evidence of a mistake of law defense, and found that there was sufficient
evidence to support the conviction.453

CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT
STATE V. SALVESON
In State v. Salveson,454 Salveson appealed a district court judgment
sentencing her to two consecutive one-year sentences following her guilty
plea to the charges of driving under the influence and reckless driving.455
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that because the crimes of driving
under the influence and aggravated reckless driving arose from substantially
different criminal objectives, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Salveson to two consecutive one-year sentences for committing
two class A misdemeanors.456 Justice Maring dissented.457
Sharol Salveson was charged with the class A misdemeanors of driving
under the influence and aggravated reckless driving on April 4, 2005.458
She was also charged with driving under suspension, a class B misdemeanor.459 She had previously been convicted of driving under the
influence in 2001 and 2004.460 After the district court rejected a plea
agreement that would have limited Salveson’s jail time to six to nine
months, she pled guilty to the charges of aggravated reckless driving and
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Id. ¶ 17, 723 N.W.2d at 540.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 24, 723 N.W.2d at 541.
2006 ND 169, 719 N.W.2d 747.
Salveson, ¶ 1, 719 N.W.2d at 747.
Id. ¶ 10, 719 N.W.2d at 749.
Id. ¶ 12, 719 N.W.2d at 750 (Maring, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 2, 719 N.W.2d at 747.
Id.
Id., 719 N.W.2d at 747-48.
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driving under the influence.461 The district court sentenced her to twelve
months of incarceration for aggravated reckless driving, and another twelve
months for driving under the influence.462 These sentences were to run
consecutively, which meant that Salveson would be incarcerated for two
years.463
Salveson appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that
the two-year sentence was illegal.464 The court first noted that North
Dakota statute authorizes consecutive sentences only if each misdemeanor
was committed “involve[s] a substantially different criminal objective,” but
the term “criminal objective” was ambiguous.465 The court reviewed a
three-part test established in State v. Ulmer 466 to aid in interpreting the term
“criminal objective.”467 In Ulmer, the court stated that multiple class A
misdemeanors involve substantially different criminal objectives if they do
not fall within one of three categories:
(1) one offense is an included offense of the other; (2) one offense
consists of a conspiracy, attempt, solicitation, or other form of
preparation to commit, or facilitation of, the other; or (3) the
offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated
kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific
instance of such conduct.468
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Ulmer’s threecategory test applied and was controlling.469 The court applied Ulmer’s
three-part test to conclude that the crimes of aggravated reckless driving
and driving under the influence involved different criminal objectives, and
“do not relate to each other under any of the three categories announced in
Ulmer.”470 As such, the court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion, and therefore upheld the consecutive two-year sentence for
committing two class A misdemeanors.471

461. Id. ¶ 3, 719 N.W.2d at 748. The State dismissed the charge of driving with a suspended
license. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-11(3)(2005)).
466. 1999 ND 245, 603 N.W.2d 865.
467. Salveson, ¶ 6, 719 N.W.2d at 748-49.
468. Id. (quoting Ulmer, ¶ 10, 603 N.W.2d at 868).
469. Id. ¶ 10, 719 N.W.2d at 749.
470. Id. ¶ 8.
471. Id. ¶ 9.
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Justice Maring wrote a dissenting opinion.472 In her eight-page dissent,
Justice Maring criticized the court for being “too invested in its own
opinion in State v. Ulmer” to recognize that the result in Ulmer was contrary to legislative history, arguing instead that consecutive sentencing in
the instant case was exactly what the legislature sought to avoid.473 Justice
Maring noted that section 12.1-32-11(3) of the North Dakota Century Code
governs a trial court’s ability to impose consecutive sentences for multiple
misdemeanors in a single case.474 She stated that the North Dakota
Supreme Court, in prior case law, had equated “criminal objective” with
“criminal intent.”475 Therefore, according to Justice Maring, the application
of section 12.1-32-11(3) should be nothing more than the Court examining
whether the criminal intent with respect to one crime was substantially
similar with the criminal intent of the other crime.476 Justice Maring argued
that the majority has altered the definition of “criminal objective” to comply
with Ulmer.477
Justice Maring disagreed with the majority that Salveson had two
distinct criminal objectives in committing a “singular act [driving with a
blood-alcohol concentration of 0.26] that is the indispensable element for
proving both crimes.”478 Justice Maring argued that no facts were
presented to establish that Salveson recklessly drove, aside from driving
with a 0.26 blood-alcohol concentration.479 Additionally, Justice Maring
noted that the majority agreed that Salveson’s crimes did not relate to each
other under any of the three categories announced in Ulmer.480 She argued
that both crimes arose from the same act (Salveson driving while
intoxicated), which is the type of situation that the drafters of section 12.132-11(3) sought to limit consecutive sentencing.481 Therefore, Justice
Maring argued that the Ulmer test should not be the sole test when
determining whether multiple class A misdemeanors invoked substantially
different criminal objectives.482 Additionally, Justice Maring looked to
state and federal legislative history to demonstrate that the drafters of
section 12.1-32-11(3) would have rejected the three-category test enacted in
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

Id. ¶ 12, 719 N.W.2d at 750.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15, 719 N.W.2d at 751.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18, 719 N.W.2d at 753.
Id.
Id. ¶ 26, 719 N.W.2d at 757.
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Ulmer as the sole test.483 Upon rejecting Ulmer as the sole test, Justice
Maring determined that the objectives for reckless driving and driving
while intoxicated are one and the same and as such, she would have
reversed and remanded for resentencing.484

CRIMINAL LAW—TRIAL—RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO CONFRONT WITNESS
CITY OF FARGO V. KOMAD
In City of Fargo v. Komad,485 Eldin Komad appealed a district court
conviction for theft on the grounds that his constitutional and statutory
rights to be present at trial were violated.486 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that Komad’s constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution was not violated.487 The court found that
Komad’s statutory rights under Rule 43 of the North Dakota Rules of
Criminal Procedure had been violated, and the violation was not harmless.488 Justice Maring wrote a concurring opinion to express concerns with
defendant rights under Rule 43.489 Justice Sandstrom wrote a dissenting
opinion.490
Komad was originally charged with theft by the City of Fargo and was
convicted in the Fargo Municipal Court.491 Komad appealed that conviction to the Cass County District Court, which set a December 12, 2005, trial
date.492 Komad was not present for the trial, but his counsel petitioned the
court for a continuance; Komad was stranded in Chicago due to bad
weather and could not arrive in Fargo until later that day.493
The City of Fargo opposed the continuance, arguing that Komad’s
excuse was false, and requested the district court to issue a bench warrant.494 The district court judge denied the continuance and stated the trial
would proceed or the appeal would be dismissed.495 Believing he had no

483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

Id. ¶¶ 21-27, 719 N.W.2d at 753-57.
Id. ¶¶ 16, 32, 719 N.W.2d at 751, 758.
2006 ND 177, 720 N.W.2d 619.
Komad, ¶ 1, 720 N.W.2d at 620.
Id. ¶ 7, 720 N.W.2d at 622.
Id. ¶ 16, 720 N.W.2d at 624.
Id. ¶ 19 (Maring, J., concurring).
Id. ¶ 22 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 1, 720 N.W.2d at 620.
Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 720 N.W.2d at 620-21.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 720 N.W.2d at 621.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
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choice, Komad’s attorney proceeded with trial despite his client’s absence,
and Komad was convicted of the theft charge.496
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court evaluated statutory law
governing municipal court appeals.497 Municipal court convictions can be
appealed to a district court, but the district court does not review the record
and decision of the municipal court.498 Instead, the district holds an entirely
new trial and independently determines whether the defendant has violated
the ordinance, because municipal courts are not courts of record.499
Next, the court considered Komad’s Sixth Amendment right to be
present at the district court trial.500 Both the United States Constitution and
the North Dakota Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
be present during trial.501 But the district court was not exercising original
jurisdiction because it heard Komad’s case on appeal.502 Therefore, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that Komad had no constitutional right to
be present for a “trial anew” in a district court on appeal from his conviction
in municipal court.503
The Court considered Komad’s rights under the North Dakota Rules of
Criminal Procedure because Komad was not guaranteed a constitutional
right to be present for a trial anew in a district court.504 Rule 43(a) of the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, made applicable to the appeal
by section 40-18-19 of the North Dakota Century Code, requires a
defendant to be present at the initial appearance, the arraignment, the plea,
every stage of trial, and sentencing.505 Under Rule 43(a), a court can continue with proceedings without a defendant when the defendant is voluntarily absent or is removed from the court due to disruptive conduct.506

496. Id.
497. Id. ¶ 4.
498. Id.
499. Id. (citing City of Grand Forks v. Lamb, 2005 ND 103, ¶ 7, 697 N.W.2d 362, 364;
Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 380 (N.D. 1994)).
500. Id. ¶ 5.
501. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
502. Id. ¶ 7, 720 N.W.2d at 622.
503. Id.
504. Id. ¶ 8.
505. Id. Section 40-18-19 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in part:
An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment of conviction or order
deferring imposition of sentence in a municipal court in accordance with the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. An appeal is perfected by notice of appeal. A
perfected appeal to the district court transfers the action to such district court for trial
anew. On all appeals from a determination in a municipal court, the district court shall
take judicial notice of all of the ordinances of the city.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-19 (2006).
506. Komad, ¶ 8, 720 N.W.2d at 622 (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)).
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Additionally, the defendant’s presence is not required when charged with a
misdemeanor offense and gives written consent for his absence, or when the
proceeding only involves a question of law, sentence correction, or
reduction.507 But, the court found that Komad had not waived his right to
be present.508 Even though the City argued that Komad’s excuse for his
absence was false, the court dismissed this argument because the City
provided no evidence to support its assertion.509
As a result, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that Komad was
tried in violation of Rule 43 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure.510 Additionally the court explained that district judge did not
have discretion to dismiss Komad’s appeal, but only had discretion to either
grant a continuance or issue a bench warrant, or do both.511 According to
the court, a dismissal of Komad’s appeal would have been a violation of the
defendant’s procedural rights, so the district judge’s decision was not
harmless error.512
Justice Maring specially concurred with the majority.513 In her
concurrence, Justice Maring argued that Rules 37 and 43 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended so that a district
court may summarily affirm the municipal court’s judgment in particular
instances.514 Particularly, Justice Maring believed that summary affirmance
by the district court should be permitted when the defendant has abandoned
his appeal from the municipal court by failing to appear at the district court
trial.515 Otherwise, she argued that the district court would be required to

507. Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)).
508. Komad, ¶ 13, 720 N.W.2d at 623. Rule 43(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
The further progress of the trial, including the return of the verdict and the imposition
of sentence, may not be prevented and the defendant waives the right to be present if
the defendant, initially present at trial or having pleaded guilty: (1) is voluntarily
absent after the trial has begun (whether or not the defendant has been informed by the
court of the obligation to remain during the trial); (2) is voluntarily absent at the
imposition of sentence; or (3) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct
will cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in conduct that
justifies the defendant’s exclusion from the courtroom.
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 43(c).
509. Id. ¶ 15, 720 N.W.2d at 624.
510. Id. ¶ 16.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. ¶ 19 (Maring, J., concurring).
514. Id.
515. Id.
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expend resources wastefully when a defendant already had the benefit of a
trial, at the municipal court.516
Justice Sandstrom wrote a dissenting opinion.517 In his dissent, Justice
Sandstrom stated that Komad wrongfully believed that the district court
proceeding was the original trial, rather than an appeal.518 Because Komad
was present during the municipal trial, Justice Sandstrom argued that the
district court proceeding was an appeal for which the constitutional right to
be present did not apply.519 Furthermore, Justice Sandstrom argued that
even though Rule 43 provides the defendant with a “trial anew,” the district
court proceeding did not change from an appeal into an original trial.520 He
explained that the evidence is only “heard anew” because the evidence is
not recorded or transcribed in the municipal court.521
Additionally, Sandstrom argued that the history of section 40-18-19
and Rule 43 do not support Komad’s position.522 He pointed out that in the
years of 1968 and 1969, when the new Rules of Criminal Procedure were
being developed, the Joint Committee of the Judicial Council and State Bar
Association discussed the need for rules to govern the procedure in making
an appeal.523 The Committee determined that Rule 37 would govern
appeals to district court.524 The minutes of the July 10, 1969, meeting also
reflected that the committee considered the provision providing for summary affirmance of the appeal in district court.525 The Committee made it
clear that section 33-12-41 of the North Dakota Century Code would not be
abrogated by the adoption of the Rules, and even though this section is not
longer part of the Century Code, it is still included as part of the
Explanatory Note for Rule 37.526 Thus, Justice Sandstrom concluded that
because the district court could have proceeded with Komad’s trial or
summarily affirmed the municipal court verdict, it did not err by doing the
former, and the criminal judgment of the district court should have been
affirmed.527

516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.

Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 22 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 29, 720 N.W.2d at 625.
Id. ¶ 31, 720 N.W.2d at 626.
Id. ¶ 35, 720 N.W.2d at 628.
Id.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 38, 720 N.W.2d at 628-629.
Id. ¶ 39, 720 N.W.2d at 629.
Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶¶ 40-41.
Id. ¶ 42, 720 N.W.2d at 630.
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CRIMINAL LAW—REVIEW—SCOPE OF REVIEW
STATE V. HANSON
In State v. Hansen,528 the State of North Dakota appealed a district
court ruling that a requirement of random drug testing as part of bail
conditions was unconstitutional.529 In dismissing the appeal, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that no actual controversy existed, and
therefore the appeal was moot.530 However, the court vacated the district
court’s order under its supervisory jurisdiction, on the ground that the
district court failed to follow established procedures and orderly process
when considering the constitutional issues.531
Brent Hansen was charged with four drug-related offenses, including
felonies, and at his initial appearance the state requested bail.532 In
response to a question from the district court, the state indicated that it had
no information regarding whether imposition of random drug testing was
necessary to ensure Hansen’s appearance.533 On its own initiative, the
district court asked Hansen’s counsel whether he wished to challenge the
imposition of random drug testing as part of the bail conditions, on the
ground that section 19-03.1-46 of the North Dakota Century Code was
unconstitutional.534 Thereafter, Hansen’s counsel challenged the constitutionality of the statute.535
The district court determined that it would not include random drug
testing as a condition of bail.536 In a lengthy written opinion, the district
court stated that section 19-03.1-46 was unconstitutional under both the
separation-of-powers doctrine and state and federal prohibitions on

528. 2006 ND 139, 717 N.W.2d 541.
529. Hansen, ¶ 1, 717 N.W.2d at 542.
530. Id.
531. Id., ¶ 12, 717 N.W.2d at 545.
532. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 717 N.W.2d at 542.
533. Id. ¶ 3.
534. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-46 (2005)). The statute provides, in part:
A court shall impose as a condition of release or bail that an individual who has been
arrested upon a felony violation of this chapter or chapter 19-03.4 not use a controlled
substance without a valid prescription from a licensed medical practitioner and that the
individual submit to a medical examination or other reasonable random testing for the
purpose of determining the person’s use of a controlled substance.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-46 (2005).
535. Hansen, ¶ 3, 717 N.W.2d at 542-43.
536. Id. ¶ 4, 717 N.W.2d at 543.
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unreasonable search and seizure.537 The State appealed the order to the
North Dakota Supreme Court.538
On appeal, the state argued that the appeal was not moot, even though
Hansen had already pled guilty and was no longer subject to bail.539 The
state argued that the trial court erred in declaring section 19-03.1-46
unconstitutional because Hansen did not properly raise the issue, nor did he
provide notice to the attorney general of the constitutional challenge.540
Additionally, the state argued that the statute did not violate either the
separation-of-powers doctrine or the prohibitions against unreasonable
search and seizure.541 Hansen agreed that the appeal was not moot, but
persisted in his argument that the statute was unconstitutional.542
In dismissing the appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
appeal was moot and no actual controversy existed because Hansen had
already pled guilty to some of the charges and been sentenced.543 The court
stated that it could not issue advisory opinion on an issue that is moot, even
if the issue may arise in the future.544 Nevertheless, the court will not
dismiss a moot issue if the issue involves a question of great public interest
and the power and authority of public officials.545 However, the court
determined that no question of great public interest or question of the power
and authority of public officials was implicated in the case.546 Therefore,
the court determined that the appeal was moot.547
Concerned by the district court’s opinion, the court vacated the district
court order that declared section 19-03.1-46 of the North Dakota Century
Code unconstitutional.548 The court criticized the district court’s handling
of the case because the district court raised the constitutional question on its
own initiative, and without notice to the attorney general; therefore, the
district ignored established procedures for considering constitutional
questions.549 Additionally, the court was particularly concerned with a
district court judge having the final say over the constitutionality of a
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Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
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Id. ¶¶ 6, 10, 717 N.W.2d at 543-44.
Id. ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d at 544.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10-11, 717 N.W.2d at 544-45.
Id. ¶ 11, 717 N.W.2d at 545.
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Id. ¶ 11, 717 N.W.2d at 544-45.
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statute.550 Therefore, pursuant to its supervisory jurisdiction, the North
Dakota Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order.551

CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—MOTOR VEHICLES
STATE V. DOOHEN
In State v. Doohen,552 the state appealed the district court’s order which
suppressed evidence found in Tyler Doohen’s vehicle after a Highway
Patrol Trooper stopped the vehicle.553 The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the district court erred in finding that the Trooper lacked probable
cause to search Doohen’s vehicle.554 Justice Kapsner wrote a dissenting
opinion.555
On February 28, 2005, Highway Patrol Trooper Roger Clemens
received a report of a vehicle driving erratically on the interstate.556
Clemens located and stopped the vehicle.557 Clemens suspected that
Doohen was driving under the influence, but upon stopping Doohen,
Clemens detected no indications of alcohol consumption.558 Instead,
Clemens observed butane lighters and syringes protruding from a tote bag
on Doohen’s passenger seat.559 After placing Doohen in his patrol car,
Clemens asked Doohen about the items.560 Doohen claimed that the
syringes were used to spray water for purposes of glass blowing.561 After
Doohen refused a search of his vehicle, Clemens placed Doohen in the
backseat of the patrol car, and summoned a sergeant to assist with searching
the vehicle.562 The officers requested a canine unit because of the items
found in the tote bag.563 During the search of the vehicle, Clemens noticed
a metal tray with residue that was later identified as methamphetamine.564
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Id. ¶ 12, 717 N.W.2d at 545 (citing State v. Hanson, 558 N.W.2d 611, 612 (1996)).
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2006 ND 239, 724 N.W.2d 158.
Doohen, ¶ 1, 724 N.W.2d at 159.
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Id. ¶ 2, 724 N.W.2d at 159.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
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The search also revealed a machete concealed in a sleeping bag.565 Doohen
was subsequently charged with carrying a concealed weapon and possession of drug paraphernalia.566 He moved to suppress the items found in his
vehicle, arguing that Clemens did not have probable cause to conduct the
search.567 The district court granted his motion and the State appealed to
the North Dakota Supreme Court.568
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court examined whether
Clemens had probable cause to search Doohen’s vehicle.569 To affirm the
district court’s order to suppress evidence, the court must find sufficient
competent evidence that is capable of supporting the district court’s
findings and the decision of the district court must not be contrary to the
manifest weight of evidence.570 The established rule for an officer’s search
of a vehicle is that “[u]nder the automobile exception, law enforcement may
search for illegal contraband without a warrant when probable cause
exists.”571 The court stated that probable cause should be determined under
a totality of the circumstances governing the search of the vehicle.572 But
an officer is permitted to “draw inferences based on his own experience in
deciding whether probable cause exists.”573 Probable cause does not
require the officer to be certain that the found items were evidence of a
crime; rather, probable cause exists when a “reasonably cautious man”
would believe that such items are evidence of a crime.574
Applying this standard, the court stated that even though Clemens was
not certain as to the use of Doohen’s hypodermic needles, the presence of
the needles, combined with the presence of the butane lighters, would have
lead a reasonably cautious individual to believe that the syringes may have
been drug paraphernalia.575 Additionally, the court stated that Doohen’s
statements about glass blowing and spraying water with needles “were
layers which contributed to the totality of the circumstances that resulted in
probable cause.”576 The court concluded that the presence of the syringes,
lighters, and statements together established probable cause to search
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Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
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Id. ¶ 8.
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Id. ¶ 10 (citing State v. Haibeck, 2004 ND 163, ¶ 10, 685 N.W.2d 512, 517).
Id. at 161.
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Doohen’s vehicle, and because the officer had probable cause to search the
vehicle, the items were admissible under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement.577 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that the district court erred in suppressing the evidence found in
Doohen’s vehicle, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.578
Justice Kapsner dissented.579 Justice Kapsner reiterated that the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement is the standard of review
for an officer to search an automobile.580 However, she disagreed with the
majority’s view that the district court’s decision was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.581 She stated that instead of having probable cause
to search Doohen’s automobile, the officers “merely had information that
may have warranted further investigation.”582 She concluded that because
Clemens had observed only “innocuous items” in Doohen’s vehicle, he had
only a “very thin layer to support his probable cause determination,” and
taken together, the items did not amount to probable cause.583 Justice
Kapsner concluded that because the district court’s decision was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence, the suppression order should be
affirmed.584

CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCH AND SEIZURE—WAIVER AND CONSENT
STATE V. ODOM
In State v. Odom,585 the State of North Dakota appealed the district
court’s order to suppress evidence discovered in a locked safe during a
consent search of Charles Odom’s hotel room.586 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order, and held that the district
court misapplied the appropriate law regarding whether consent to search a
room extends to consent to search containers within that room.587
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In December 2005, Odom was staying at the Days Inn in Bismarck,
North Dakota.588 Odom was arrested at the hotel due to an outstanding
arrest warrant for a drug paraphernalia charge.589 After placing Odom
under arrest and informing him of his Miranda rights, the arresting officer
questioned Odom about the presence of narcotics in the room.590 Initially,
Odom denied the presence of narcotics, but upon further questioning he
admitted that narcotics were present in the room.591 The officer asked
Odom how he had arrived in Bismarck, and Odom replied that he had taken
a bus and had been picked up by an acquaintance.592 The officer was
familiar with the acquaintance as a crack cocaine dealer.593 Then, the
officer asked Odom for consent to search the room, to which Odom replied,
“[Y]ou are going to find it anyway. Go ahead.”594 Based on the arrest and
Odom’s consent, the officer conducted a search of the room, where he
discovered a paper with the name and phone number of the acquaintance, as
well as a locked safe.595 Odom denied having the key to the safe, so the
officer obtained the master key from hotel staff.596 Inside the safe, the
officer discovered a digital scale with cocaine residue, a roll of cash totaling
just under $1000, and a “big chunk of crack cocaine.”597
Odom was charged with felony narcotic possession and distribution
charges.598 He moved to suppress the contents of the safe as illegally
procured evidence.599 The district court granted his motion to suppress,
reasoning that although Odom consented to a search of his hotel room, he
retained an expectation of privacy in the safe because he did not give
specific consent its search.600 The State appealed the district court’s order,
arguing that Odom’s consent to search the room included the locked safe.601
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the issue was whether
the officer’s search of the safe was a reasonable search and seizure of
evidence.602 At the outset, the court noted that any warrantless search must
588.
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594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

Id. ¶ 2, 722 N.W.2d at 371.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 722 N.W.2d at 371-72.
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be supported by a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement,
such as consent.603 Whether an individual consented is determined by
“considering what an objectively reasonable person would have understood
the consent to include.”604 The court found that Odom voluntarily consented to the officer’s search of the hotel room.605 Furthermore, the court
determined that Odom’s consent was without limitations, so a reasonable
officer would have believed that Odom’s consent extended to a search of
the hotel room and the safe.606 An individual need not consent to the search
of every container in a room so long as consent was given to search the
room.607 The court noted that drawing an opposite conclusion—requiring
law enforcement to acquire consent to search each container in a room—
would place an unreasonable burden on law enforcement.608 Additionally,
the court stated that consent to search does not extend to consent to inflict
damage to the place(s) to be searched, but held that the district court erred
in making this a material issue in the case, given that the officer did not
destroy the safe to open it, but rather opened it with keys.609
Finally, the court noted that to be “reasonable” the scope of a search
must be limited to its expressed object.610 This inquiry is based upon what
each party knew at the time the consent to search was given.611 The court
held that Odom knew the object of the search was narcotics because the
questions asked of him by the arresting officer all pertained to narcotics.612
Therefore, the court determined that the search was reasonable because
the scope of the search was limited to its expressed object.613 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order to suppress the
evidence procured during the search of Odom’s hotel room safe, and
remanded the case for further proceedings.614

603. Id.
604. Id. ¶ 10, 722 N.W.2d at 373. (quoting United States v. Urbina, 431 F.3d 305, 310 (8th
Cir. 2005)).
605. Id. ¶ 11.
606. Id.
607. Id. (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).
608. Id.
609. Id. ¶ 16, 722 N.W.2d at 374.
610. Id. ¶ 12, 722 N.W.2d at 373.
611. Id.
612. Id. ¶ 13.
613. Id.
614. Id. ¶¶ 17, 18, 722 N.W.2d at 374.
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FAMILY LAW—CHILD CUSTODY
GIETZEN V. GABEL
In Gietzen v. Gabel,615 Christopher Gietzen appealed a district court
judgment that awarded Jessica Gabel sole custody of their minor child.616
The district court granted Gietzen visitation and ordered him to pay child
support.617 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
custody determination and remanded the case for findings of domestic
violence under the appropriate legal standard.618 Justice Maring wrote a
dissenting opinion.619 Chief Justice VandeWalle specially concurred with
the majority on remanding the case for findings of fact and concurred with
the dissent as to the domestic violence standard for custody determinations.620
In 1996, Gietzen and Gabel had a son together.621 The two parties had
a tumultuous relationship and were never married.622 Gabel later married
another man, but the parties continued to have contact until January 2002
for the sake of their child.623
Gabel claimed that Gietzen regularly physically abused her throughout
their relationship.624 In December 2001, Gietzen choked Gabel until she
passed out, but Gietzen claimed that his actions were in response to Gabel
coming after him with a knife.625 In January 2002, Gabel reported to the
police that Gietzen was threatening her with a pocketknife, while Gietzen
claimed that he was just cleaning his fingernails with the knife; no charges
were filed.626 Later that month, while Gabel gave Gietzen a haircut, an
argument arose and Gabel stabbed Gietzen in the hand, chest, and face with
scissors.627 Gabel was charged with attempted murder, but pled guilty to
assault.628 The child was then taken into custody by Cass County Social
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Services.629 Eventually, the child was returned to Gietzen, but Gabel was
granted visitation.630
After Gietzen moved with the child to Halliday, he sued Gabel to
establish paternity, obtain custody, set visitation, and establish child support.631 Gietzen was granted temporary custody.632 During the trial, both
parties claimed to be victims of domestic violence.633 Ultimately, the district court awarded physical custody to Gabel, granted visitation to Gietzen,
and ordered Gietzen to pay child support.634 Gabel appealed claiming that
the district court misapplied the law on domestic violence and “erred in
measuring the amount of domestic violence committed by both parties.”635
Section 14-09-06.1 of the North Dakota Century Code requires custody
of a child to be awarded to the person who promotes the best interests of the
child, and the factors to determine the best interests are provided in section
14-09-06.2(1)(a-m).636 Within the best interest factors, a “rebuttable presumption against awarding custody of a child to a perpetrator of domestic
violence” is found in section 14-09-06.2(1)(j).637 If there is credible evidence of domestic violence, that evidence is the predominate factor in
custody decisions.638 Whether the statutory presumption is applicable is a
finding of fact that cannot be reversed unless clearly erroneous.639
In analyzing Gietzen’s argument that both parties committed domestic
violence, the North Dakota Supreme Court examined the evolution of
domestic violence as a factor in child custody determinations.640 The North
Dakota Legislature failed to address situations in which both parents committed domestic violence, thus the court in Krank v. Krank,641 construed the
1993 amendments to assess these situations.642 Summarizing Krank, the
court noted that when both parents have committed domestic violence, a
district court must measure the amount and extent that each parent inflicts
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domestic violence.643 If one parent inflicts domestic violence to a significantly greater amount, the presumption is applied against him or her, but if
the amounts are proportional, the presumption ceases to exist.644 However,
in 1997, the domestic violence statute was amended again to create a
rebuttable presumption against an offender of domestic violence and the
offender “may not be awarded sole or joint custody of the child.”645 The
amended statute permits the presumption to be overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence.646 Furthermore, the amended statute authorizes a
district court to award custody to a suitable third party if necessary.647
Here, the district court applied the Krank proportionality test and
determined that the “parties’ circumstances indicate the domestic violence
is unlikely to occur in the future and this factor favors neither party.” 648
The court found that the district court’s findings lacked the specificity required for a situation in which both parties committed domestic violence.649
The court stated that where a reciprocal abuse is alleged, the district court
must focus its “findings more carefully and specifically on the degree of
violent behavior by each parent.”650 Additionally, the 1997 amendment
must be used when reciprocal abuse triggers the presumption.651 The
district court must then determine “whether the presumption has been
overcome in favor of a parent by evidence that is clear and convincing, or
whether other suitable custodial arrangements with a third person should be
made.”652
Moreover, Gabel argued that if her domestic violence was greater than
Gietzen’s, she was still entitled to custody because of his continued drug
use.653 However, this claim was not supported by the district court’s
findings.654 Alternatively, Gietzen argued that the district court’s findings
of fact were not supported by evidence.655 The court was unable to conclude that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous.656 Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
643.
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Id. (citing Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 850).
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decision on custody and remanded the case for determination of domestic
violence under appropriate law.657
Justice Maring wrote a dissenting opinion.658 She believed the district
court had properly set forth and applied the correct standard for assessing
domestic violence in child custody decisions.659 In her dissent, Justice
Maring suggested that the long-settled Krank standard should be used in
dealing with situations in which both parents have committed domestic
violence.660 Justice Maring argued that the majority “would have the
presumption against custody arise against both parents whenever evidence
is present of domestic violence sufficient to trigger the presumption.”661
The majority’s interpretation would require that a third person be awarded
custody of the child unless a parent could overcome the presumption by
clear and convincing evidence.662
Moreover, Justice Maring determined that neither the 1997
amendments to section 14-09-06.2(1)(j), nor the legislative history of the
statute, indicated a departure from the standard produced in Krank.663 In
fact, Justice Maring pointed out that the North Dakota Supreme Court has
followed the Krank standard in many cases since the enactment of the 1997
amendments.664 Thus, Justice Maring agreed with the district court in its
application of the Krank standard.665
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred with both the majority and the
dissent.666 Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred with the majority to remand the case for specific findings.667 However, Chief Justice VandeWalle
concurred with the dissent as to the domestic violence standard.668
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FAMILY LAW—DIVORCE—CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
WILSON V. IBARRA
In Wilson v. Ibarra,669 Esteban Ibarra (Ibarra) appealed from an
amended judgment and decree that denied him visitation with his minor
daughter.670 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed Ibarra’s denial of
visitation and remanded for sufficiently detailed findings.671 In particular,
the court remanded for “more detailed findings to establish that any form of
visitation would result in physical or emotional harm to the child.”672
Alternatively, the court recommended that the district court order supervised visitation before terminating all visitation.673 Justice Crothers wrote a
dissenting opinion.674
Ibarra and Ruth Jewel Wilson (Wilson) were married in Wahpeton,
North Dakota, on May 13, 2000, approximately eight months after their
daughter was born.675 Throughout their relationship, Ibarra was an alcoholic and physically abused Wilson.676 Wilson brought several criminal
charges against Ibarra for the physical abuse.677 In December 2000, Wilson
left the parties’ home with their daughter and Ibarra’s minor son.678 In
October 2002, Wilson filed an action for divorce against Ibarra.679 Prior to
the divorce being granted, Ibarra moved to California in December 2002,
without leaving a forwarding address.680 Ultimately, in February 2003, the
district court entered a default divorce judgment and decree, which awarded
Wilson custody of their daughter, ordered Ibarra to pay child support, and
granted Ibarra “reasonable visitation.”681 Ibarra returned to North Dakota in
October 2004 with his new wife.682 In November 2004, Ibarra made his
first child support payment.683 Ibarra only saw the child once during a
chance meeting in February 2005.684 Ibarra entered into anger management
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therapy and underwent alcohol evaluations.685 Ibarra’s last contact with the
child had occurred in 2002.686
In April 2005, Ibarra moved to amend the divorce judgment and decree
in order to set a visitation schedule with the child.687 Wilson responded
with a motion to deny Ibarra’s request and to amend the divorce judgment
to either completely deny Ibarra visitation with their daughter or grant
Ibarra only supervised visitation.688
Following a hearing, the district court denied Ibarra’s request and
granted Wilson’s motion to deny Ibarra any visitation.689 Pursuant to
sections 14-07-17 and 27-20-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, the
district court determined Ibarra had abandoned the child and that any form
of visitation would be “likely to endanger her physical or emotional health
and well being.”690 The district court provided eight separate findings on
which its decision was based.691
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the district
court’s findings did not “demonstrate in detail the physical or emotional
harm to the child resulting from any form of visitation.”692 Moreover, the
court stated that the district court provided “no nexus or link demonstrating
how Ibarra’s past problems would result in physical or emotional harm to
the child at this time.”693
The governing standard in such visitation disputes is “whether allowing
visitation would physically or emotionally harm the child.”694 The court
discussed that while state statutes and case law “clearly recognize that
visitation with a noncustodial parent may be curtailed or eliminated entirely
if it is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health,”695 the
primary purpose of such visitation is to promote the best interests of the
child and limitations on visitation must be based on a preponderance of the
evidence.696 The court reiterated that “[a]bsent a detailed demonstration of

685. Id.
686. Id. ¶ 4.
687. Id. ¶ 6.
688. Id.
689. Id. ¶ 7.
690. Id.
691. Id. at 570-71.
692. Id. ¶ 14, 718 N.W.2d at 573.
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695. Id. ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d at 571 (quoting Litoff v. Pinter, 2003 ND 172, ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d
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harm, such a restriction appears punitive.”697 Moreover, the court determined that the district court’s decision was punitive because it did not
provide for any possibility of future visitation regardless of a change in
circumstances.698 Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the district court did not make sufficient findings to support a total
termination of Ibarra’s visitation.699
Justice Crothers dissented.700 Justice Crothers’s dissent is based on his
belief that the district court had made sufficient findings and conclusions
for the court to affirm a total termination of Ibarra’s visitation.701 Justice
Crothers criticized the majority for moving “the goalposts out of range by
ignoring the applicable preponderance of evidence burden of proof,” rather
than accepting the district court’s conclusion and findings of fact.702 Specifically, Justice Crothers charged the North Dakota Supreme Court with
substituting its judgment for that of the district court to achieve supervised
visitation for Ibarra.703

INSURANCE LAW—AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE—UNINSURED OR UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
HASPER V. CENTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
In Hasper v. Center Mutual Insurance Company,704 Jason Hasper
brought an action against his automobile insurer, Center Mutual Insurance
Company (Center Mutual), to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits
after settling a tort claim without Center Mutual’s consent.705 The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of Center Mutual and Hasper
appealed.706 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that an insurer must
demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from lack of notice of tort settlement,
that a tortfeasor’s assets are material to determination of actual prejudice,
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and here the factual issues regarding prejudice precluded summary
judgment.707
In November 2000, Hasper was injured in a motor vehicle accident in
South Dakota.708 Hasper was a passenger in the vehicle and the driver was
his cousin, Chris Goehring.709 In January 2001, Goehring’s insurer, Allied
Insurance (Allied), informed Hasper that Goehring’s policy limit was
$100,000.710 Hasper later received the $100,000 policy limit and executed
a release from all claims arising out of the accident.711 Hasper lived with
his parents and his parents had an automobile insurance policy from Center
Mutual that provided UIM coverage and personal injury protection (PIP)
coverage.712 Hasper accepted the $100,000 settlement from Allied without
contacting or notifying Center Mutual.713 In April 2001, Hasper’s attorney
sent a letter to Center Mutual indicating Hasper’s intentions to claim UIM
benefits and release the other driver, Chris Goehring, unless Center Mutual
preserved its subrogation claim against Goehring by substituting its own
check for the $100,000 that Hasper received.714 Center Mutual refused to
substitute its check because Hasper had previously signed a release and
accepted the policy limits from Allied.715
In May 2002, Hasper sued Center Mutual in order to recover UIM and
PIP benefits.716 The district court ruled that Hasper was prohibited from
seeking UIM benefits because he failed to provide prior notice of the
settlement to Center Mutual.717 The district court dismissed the UIM claim
and the PIP claim went to district.718 In July 2005, the district court
awarded Hasper damages against Center Mutual under his PIP claim.719
Hasper appealed the district court’s dismissal of his UIM claim against
Center Mutual.720
Under section 26.1-40-15.3(1) of the North Dakota Century Code, the
insured is entitled to UIM coverage from his insurer that is equal to the

707.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.

Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 19, 723 N.W.2d at 416-17.
Id. ¶ 2, 723 N.W.2d at 411.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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uninsured motorist coverage.721 The UIM coverage must pay compensatory
damages to the insured because the insured would be entitled to such
coverage from the owner or operator of the underinsured vehicle.722 If a
UIM insured settles with the underinsured tortfeasor, the insured must
provide written notice of the proposed settlement to the UIM insurer.723 If
the insured fails to give prior written notice, its UIM insurer may exclude
coverage.724 However, once the UIM insurer has received notice of the
proposed settlement, the insurer must substitute its own funds for the
settlement to preserve its subrogation rights against the underinsured
tortfeasor.725 In this case, Center Mutual’s provisions corresponded to
North Dakota’s statutory provisions on UIM coverage.726
Under state law and Center Mutual’s policy provisions, the insured
should promptly notify the UIM carrier of a proposed settlement with the
tortfeasor and the tortfeasor’s insurer.727 Then, the UIM insurer has thirty
days to decide whether there is a reasonable possibility of collecting more
than the policy limits from the underinsured tortfeasor.728 The crucial
question was whether Hasper’s acceptance of the settlement and release,
without providing prior notice to Center Mutual, “adversely affect[ed] the
rights of the insurer.”729
The district court found that Center Mutual was adversely affected by
Hasper’s settlement because Center Mutual could have sought a judgment
against Goehring that could have been collected in the future.730 Furthermore, the district court expanded its ruling and held that the failure of the
insured to provide prior notice of a settlement always, as a matter of law,
adversely affects the UIM insurer because the insurer loses its right to
pursue a subrogation claim, which might be collectable some time in the
future.731
This was a case of first impression and the North Dakota Supreme
Court evaluated rulings in other jurisdictions to determine whether consent-

721. Id. ¶ 7, 723 N.W.2d at 412.
722. Id. ¶ 7.
723. Id.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id. ¶ 8.
727. Id. ¶ 9, 723 N.W.2d at 413.
728. Id.
729. Id. ¶ 10 (citing N.D. CENT CODE § 26.1-40-15.6(1) (2002)). Section 26.1-40-15.6(1)
states in part, “The insurer is not bound by any agreement or settlement without its prior
knowledge and consent.” N.D. CENT CODE § 26.1-40-15.6(1) (2002).
730. Id.
731. Id.
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to-settle or notice-of-settlement clauses require actual prejudice to be
enforced.732 A majority of state courts have held that the insurer bears the
burden of establishing that an unauthorized settlement had an actual adverse
effect on the insurer’s interests.733 Under the majority view, if the consentto-settle clause is enforced without a showing of actual prejudice, the result
is forfeiture of the UIM coverage and the insurer receives a windfall while
the deserving insured person is deprived of recovery.734 Therefore, the
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that if the insurer is required to
demonstrate actual prejudice, an appropriate balance is created between
protecting an insurer’s interests and avoiding forfeiture of coverage when
an insurer has not been harmed.735
The court found that a UIM insurer must prove that it suffered actual
prejudice to deny coverage when the insured’s fails to notify the insurer of a
proposed settlement with the tortfeasor.736 The court held that the determination of whether an insurer has been adversely affected or prejudiced by an
unauthorized settlement is a question of fact that is generally inappropriate
for summary judgment.737 The court found that the district court erred in
finding the tortfeasor’s assets immaterial. The court stated that particular
factors should have been evaluated by the district court in determining
whether summary judgment was met: (1) the amount of tortfeasor’s assets;
(2) the likelihood that the insurer would recover via subrogation; (3) the
amount of the insured’s damages; and, (4) the expenses and risks involved
in litigating the insured’s cause of action.738 Because the district court did
not analyze these factors, it applied an incorrect legal standard.739
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court
improperly granted summary judgment to dismiss Hasper’s UIM claim
against Center Mutual.740 Additionally, the district court failed to apply the
correct factors to determine whether Center Mutual suffered actual prejudice by Hasper’s settlement and release.741 Therefore, the court reversed
and remanded the case for a determination of actual prejudice under the
proper legal standard.742
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.
741.
742.

Id. ¶ 11, 723 N.W.2d at 413-14.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12, 723 N.W.2d at 414-15.
Id. ¶ 14, 723 N.W.2d at 415.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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INSURANCE LAW—AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE—UNINSURED OR UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
SANDBERG V. AMERICAN FAMILY INS. CO.
In Sandberg v. American Family Insurance Co.,743 Laura Sandberg
(Sandberg) appealed from a grant of summary judgment dismissing her
action for uninsured motorist coverage against American Family Insurance
Company (American Family), her uninsured motor vehicle insurer.744 The
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that American Family was not
adversely affected by Sandberg’s settlement with Workforce Safety and
Insurance (WSI).745 Moreover, the court concluded that disputed issues of
material fact did exist regarding American Family’s statutory right to
reduce damages payable to Sandberg for uninsured motorist coverage by
the amount paid or payable to her for workers’ compensation benefits, thus
reversing and remanding.746 Justice Crothers specially concurred with the
majority’s opinion.747
In April 1999, Sandberg was injured in a motor vehicle-pedestrian
accident, during the course of her employment, while attempting to stop a
suspected shoplifter from leaving the Wal-Mart parking lot in a motor
vehicle.748 Neither the driver nor the vehicle was covered under motor
vehicle liability insurance.749 Consequently, Sandberg initially received
benefits for her injury from WSI; however, WSI subsequently determined
she had misrepresented her claim, and ordered Sandberg to repay $4108.33
in previously paid benefits and to forfeit all future benefits in connection
with her claim.750 In April 2001, without obtaining American Family’s
consent, Sandberg entered into a settlement agreement with WSI in which
she agreed to “a ‘full and complete settlement’ of all future workers’
compensation benefits and WSI agreed not to pursue collection of any
previously paid benefits unless Sandberg received a settlement in a thirdparty action.”751 Also under the settlement agreement, WSI “‘retain[ed] its
subrogated interest in [Sandberg’s] third party action for all benefits paid on
[her] claim,’” pursuant to section 65-01-09 of the North Dakota Century

743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.

2006 ND 198, 722 N.W.2d 359.
Sandberg, ¶ 1, 722 N.W.2d at 360.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 19, 722 N.W.2d at 364 (Crothers, J., concurring).
Id. ¶ 2, 722 N.W.2d at 360.
Id. ¶ 3, 722 N.W.2d at 361.
Id. ¶ 2, 722 N.W.2d at 360.
Id.
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Code.752 Thereafter, Sandberg sought uninsured motorist coverage under
her policy with American Family.753
When American Family denied her claim, Sandberg sued American
Family for breach of contract and bad faith.754 In granting American
Family’s motion for summary judgment, the district court determined that
Sandberg was not eligible for uninsured motorist coverage because she had
not obtained American Family’s consent to the settlement with WSI and the
settlement adversely affected American Family.755
On appeal, Sandberg argued that her settlement with WSI did not
preclude her from pursuing a claim for uninsured motorist coverage because
WSI is not a person who may be legally liable for her injuries.756 Sandberg
also claimed that her settlement with WSI did not adversely affect
American Family under section 26.1-40-15.6(7) of the North Dakota Century Code.757 American Family argued that Sandberg’s “settlement with
WSI adversely affected its rights because WSI would be liable for future
medical expenses, disability benefits, and potentially a permanent impairment award.”758
The applicable segment of American Family’s policy with Sandberg
allowed the “limits of her uninsured coverage to be reduced by ‘[a] payment
made or amount payable because of bodily injury under any workers’ compensation or disability benefits law or any similar law.’”759 Additionally,
the policy provided that an insured would not be eligible for uninsured
coverage due to bodily injury when the insured enters into a settlement
agreement when American Family did not consent to the agreement.760
However, the North Dakota statutory provisions for uninsured coverage,
contained in sections 26.1-40-15.1 through 26.1-40-15.7 of the North
Dakota Century Code, are more restrictive than American Family’s policy
and require that an unauthorized settlement adversely affect the insurer.761
Since an insurer may provide coverage terms more favorable, but not less
favorable, to its insured than are required by statute, the court determined
752. Id. ¶ 2, 722 N.W. 2d at 360-61.
753. Id. ¶ 3, 722 N.W.2d at 361
754. Id.
755. Id.
756. Id. ¶ 5.
757. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.6(7) (2006) (providing that uninsured coverage
does not apply when the insured, without the written consent of the insurer, makes any agreement
or settlement with any person who may be legally liable for the insured’s bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death if the agreement adversely affects the rights of the insurer).
758. Sandberg, ¶ 11, 722 N.W.2d at 362.
759. Id. ¶ 6, 722 N.W.2d at 361.
760. Id.
761. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 722 N.W.2d at 361-62.
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that the issues on appeal are controlled by the statutory language and not
American Family’s policy.762
Section 26.1-40-15.4(1)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code provides
that an insurer has a statutory right to reduce an insured’s damages for
uninsured motorist coverage by the amount “paid or payable” to the insured
under any workers’ compensation law.763 However, section 26.1-4015.4(1) does not reduce the amount of available coverage for uninsured
motorist coverage because it relates to how damages are dealt with in
determining what amount the insurance company must pay.764 Similarly,
the only purpose of section 26.1-40-15.4(1) is to avoid any potential
duplication for recovery of the same loss.765 Here, the court construed
“payable” to mean “any workers’ compensation benefits Sandberg would
have been paid had WSI not ordered her to forfeit all future benefits in
connection with her claim.”766 Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded “an insured’s unauthorized settlement with WSI does not
adversely affect the insurer because, notwithstanding the settlement with
WSI, the insurer retains his statutory right to reduce the damages payable to
the insured for uninsured coverage by the amount paid or payable to the
insured under workers’ compensation law.”767
The North Dakota Supreme Court found it did not need to decide
whether WSI was a “person who may be legally liable” for Sandberg’s
injuries under section 26.1-40-15.6(7) because the court concluded that
American Family had not been adversely affected by Sandberg’s settlement
with WSI.768 Therefore, the court found that American Family’s right to
reduce its damages payable to Sandberg for uninsured coverage by any
amount paid or payable to her by WSI was not adversely affected by the
settlement.769
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and
remanded for further proceedings regarding the extent of Sandberg’s
injuries caused by the accident and what amount of workers’ compensation
benefits Sandberg would have been paid.770 The North Dakota Supreme
Court further provided that if Sandberg is awarded damages at trial for past

762.
763.
764.
765.
766.
767.
768.
769.
770.

Id. ¶ 8, 722 N.W.2d at 362 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.7(5) (2006)).
Id. ¶ 12, 722 N.W.2d at 363.
Id. (citing DeCoteau v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 ND 3, ¶ 13, 603 N.W.2d 906, 911).
Id. (citing DeCoteau, ¶ 13, 603 N.W.2d at 912).
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14, 722 N.W.2d at 363-64.
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15.
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and future losses, American Family can then request that the district court
reduce those damages by the amounts which would be paid or payable
under the workers’ compensation statutes.771
Justice Crothers specially concurred with the majority’s conclusions.772
However, he wrote separately to express concern regarding the excessive
scope and resulting dicta of particular portions of the majority’s opinion.773
Therefore, Justice Crothers concurred in the majority’s conclusions only,
and not in its method of reaching the conclusions.774

INSURANCE LAW—CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
ACUITY V . BURD & SMITH CONSTR., INC.
ACUITY, a mutual insurance company, appealed a summary judgment
decision that obligated ACUITY, to indemnify its insured, Burd & Smith
Construction, Inc. (Burd & Smith) under a commercial general liability
insurance (CGL) policy.775 More specifically, the summary judgment
required ACUITY to indemnify Burd & Smith for damages to an apartment
owned by Chad and Rebecca Caillier.776 The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the “CGL policy did not provide coverage to repair or replace a
defective roof on the apartment building, but did provide coverage for other
property damage to the apartment building.”777
The Cailliers brought suit against Burd & Smith and Mark Ehley
seeking to recover for damage to an apartment building they owned in
Fargo.778 The Cailliers alleged that they had hired Burd & Smith as a
general contractor and Ehley as a subcontractor or employee of Burd &
Smith to replace their roof.779 The Cailliers specifically claimed that Ehley
had failed to properly secure the roof during the course of repairs, which
resulted in water damage to the building from rainstorms.780 The Cailliers
asserted claims of negligence and breach of contract against Burd & Smith
and Ehley for replacement of the roof.781 Moreover, “two building tenants
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.
777.
778.
779.
780.
781.

Id.
Id. ¶ 19 (Crothers, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. ¶ 21, 722 N.W.2d at 365.
Acuity v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187, ¶ 1, 721 N.W.2d 33, 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 29, 721 N.W.2d at 42-43.
Id. ¶ 2, 721 N.W.2d at 35.
Id.
Id.
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claimed they sustained property loss as a result of water damage and also
sued Burd & Smith and Ehley.”782
Burd & Smith was insured under a CGL policy issued by ACUITY
during the time that it was working on Cailliers’ roof.783 The underlying
action proceeded to trial and the district court entered a directed verdict,
finding that Ehley had breached his contract with the Cailliers.784 The jury
found that Ehley was not acting as Burd & Smith’s employee or as its agent
at the time he entered into his contract with the Cailliers.785 However, the
jury did find that Burd & Smith had ratified the contract between Ehley and
the Cailliers, and awarded the Cailliers $370,000 in damages.786 Following
the jury verdict, the district court concluded that the jury’s finding that Burd
& Smith had ratified Ehley’s contract with the Cailliers was “manifestly
contrary to the greater weight of the evidence” and granted a new trial.787
While the underlying action remained pending, ACUITY commenced
this action for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that it was not
obligated to defend or indemnify Burd & Smith in connection with the
underlying action.788 ACUITY brought a motion for summary judgment,
seeking a determination that the liability policy under which Burd & Smith
was insured did not provide coverage for the Cailliers’ damages.789 While
the motion for summary judgment was pending, the Cailliers and Burd &
Smith entered into a settlement in which “Burd & Smith consented to a
judgment of $412,788.45 against it, on the condition that any recovery
would be collected only from the proceeds of the CGL policy.”790
The district court denied ACUITY’s summary judgment motion and
granted the Cailliers summary judgment, finding that ACUITY must
indemnify Burd & Smith for Burd & Smith’s responsibility for damages to
the apartment building.791 The district court ruled there was coverage under
the insuring provisions of the CGL policy because the Cailliers’ claim
against Burd & Smith in the underlying action constituted an

782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.

Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. ¶ 5, 721 N.W.2d at 36.
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“‘occurrence.’”792 The district court decided that the “contractual liability”
exclusion was inapplicable because Burd & Smith’s liability was not an
assumed contract under the language of that exclusion.793 The district court
also decided that two “damage to property” exclusions were ambiguous,
and construed them against ACUITY so that Burd & Smith were not
excluded coverage for damages to the apartment building.794
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed whether the
district court properly granted summary judgment by reviewing the
interpretation of ACUITY’s CGL policy with Burd & Smith, to determine
if there was coverage.795 First, the court stated that a CGL policy was not
intended to insure business risk nor the insured’s work itself, but rather it
was intended to insure the consequential damages that stem from that
work.796 As a result, the court stated that breach of contract claims may be
within the scope of coverage of a CGL policy and that the policy could
provide coverage for tort claims, contact claims, and claims of statutory
violations as long as requisite accidental occurrence and property damage
were present.797
The court looked to the rulings of the Wisconsin Supreme Court to
determine what types of claims constitute “occurrences” under the insuring
provisions of a CGL policy.798 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a
CGL’s policy language did not support a distinction between a tort and a

792. Id. The policy provided that the insurance applied “[t]o bodily injury or property
damage only if: (a) The bodily injury or property damage is caused by an occurrence that takes
place in the coverage territory.” Id. ¶ 8, 721 N.W.2d at 37.
793. Id. ¶ 5, 721 N.W.2d at 36. ACUITY’s policy concerning contractual liability provided
in part:
Bodily injury or property damage for which the insured is obligated to pay damages
by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does
not apply to liability for damages: (1) That the insured would have in the absence of
the contract or agreement; or (2) Assumed in a contract or agreement that is an insured
contract, provided the bodily injury or property damage occurs subsequent to the
execution of the contract or agreement.
Id. ¶ 9, 721 N.W.2d at 37.
794. Id. ¶ 5, 721 N.W.2d at 36-37. The two property exclusions read as follows:
(5) That particular part of the real property on which you or any contractor or
subcontractor working directly or indirectly on your behalf is performing operations, if
the property damage arises out of those operations; or (6) That particular part of any
property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because your work was incorrectly
performed on it.
Id. ¶ 9, 721 N.W. 2d at 37.
795. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 721 N.W.2d at 36.
796. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 721 N.W.2d at 37 (citing Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Lynne, 2004
ND 166, ¶ 9, 686 N.W.2d 118, 122).
797. Id. ¶ 12, 721 N.W.2d at 38.
798. Id. ¶ 13 (citing American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶¶
37-49, 673 N.W.2d 65, 75-79).
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contract for purposes of deciding whether a loss was within an initial grant
of coverage and an occurrence was not defined by the legal category of the
claim.799 Upon that determination, the North Dakota Supreme Court
rejected ACUITY’s claim that breach of contract claims were not per se
within the scope of coverage of a CGL policy.800
As the court explained, the critical issue was whether the property
damage to the apartment building was caused by an “occurrence.”801
ACUITY’s CGL policy defined an occurrence as “an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions,” but did not define “accident.”802 Therefore, the court relied on
precedent, which defined the word accident as “happening by chance,
unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of things.”803
Combining the definitions of “accident” and “occurrence” within the
context of a CGL policy, the court stated that when defective workmanship
results in damage only to the insured’s work product itself, there is no
accidental occurrence.804 On the other hand, when the faulty workmanship
causes bodily injury or property damage to something other than the
insured’s work product, and unintended and unexpected event has occurred
and coverage does exist.805 Therefore, the court held that the Cailliers’
claim alleging damages to the interior of the apartment building was the
type of “occurrence” covered by ACUITY’s policy.806
Additionally, ACUITY argued that its two property damage exclusions
unambiguously excluded coverage for damages against Burd & Smith in
the underlying action.807 The court found that the exclusions were not ambiguous when construed in their entirety.808 It disagreed with ACUITY’s
argument that the entire apartment building is the insured’s work product or
project, because that argument ignored the limiting language “particular
part” of property used in two of the exclusions.809 The court looked to
dictionary definitions of the words “particular” and “part” to determine that

799. Id.
800. Id. ¶ 13, 721 N.W.2d at 39.
801. Id. ¶ 14.
802. Id.
803. Id. (citing Wall v. Penn. Life Ins. Co., 274 N.W.2d 208, 216 (N.D. 1979); Kasper v.
Provident Life Ins. Co., 285 N.W.2d 548, 553 (N.D. 1979)).
804. Id. ¶ 15 (citing Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., Inc., 684 N.W.2d 571, 578
(Neb. 2004)).
805. Id. (citing Auto-Owners, 684 N.W.2d at 578).
806. Id. ¶ 17, 721 N.W.2d at 40.
807. Id. ¶ 20.
808. Id. ¶ 26, 721 N.W.2d at 41.
809. Id.
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the exclusion only applied to the roof because the contract was for the
replacement of the roof.810
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that any damages for repair or
replacement of a defective roof are excluded from coverage under the CGL
policy, but damages to the interior of the apartment building are not
excluded.811 Therefore, the court modified the district court decision to the
extent so that the Cailliers can claim damages to the interior of the
apartment building, but the damages to the roof are excluded.812

LANDLORD AND TENANT—RE -ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BY
LANDLORD
LIVINGGOOD V. BALSDON
In Livinggood v. Balsdon,813 a landlord appealed the district court’s
decision to award treble damages, plus court costs, to the tenant for the
landlord’s forcible ejection of the tenant from farmland he was leasing.814
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision.815
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
holding a hearing on remand regarding the issue of treble damages and
found a sufficient basis for forcible eviction under section 32-03-29 of the
North Dakota Century Code.816
Danny Livinggood (Livinggood) and DeWayne Balsdon entered into a
five-year farm lease in February 2003 and Livinggood farmed the land,
made an advanced lease payment, and prepared the land throughout that
year.817 In April 2004, DeWayne Balsdon sold the farmland to his nephew
Aaron Balsdon (Balsdon).818 When Livinggood tried to farm the land in the
spring of 2004, Balsdon interfered and claimed that Livinggood’s lease was
invalid.819 Balsdon twice drove in front of Livinggood’s tractor and
threatened to call law enforcement in order to prevent Livinggood from
farming the land.820 Livinggood sued Balsdon to enforce the lease and
810.
811.
812.
813.
814.
815.
816.
817.
818.
819.
820.

Id. at 41-42.
Id. ¶ 27, 721 N.W.2d at 42.
Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 721 N.W.2d at 42-43.
2006 ND 215, 722 N.W.2d 716.
Livinggood, ¶¶ 1, 3, 722 N.W.2d at 717-18.
Id. ¶ 6, 722 N.W.2d at 718.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2, 722 N.W.2d at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2007]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

1159

requested damages in the form of lost profits for Balsdon’s failure to
enforce the lease or triple damages for Balsdon’s forcible exclusion of
Livinggood from the leased land.821
The district court found that Livinggood held a valid lease to farm the
land and awarded him $15,106.92 in lost profits.822 The district court did
not allow Livinggood to continue to farm the land because money damages
were adequate compensation and it did not award triple damages for
forcible exclusion from the property.823 Livinggood appealed to the North
Dakota Supreme Court, and in Livinggood v. Balsdon,824 the North Dakota
Supreme Court agreed that Livinggood was entitled to monetary damages
rather than enforcement of the lease.825 The court remanded the case
because the district court failed to make findings on damages under the
correct legal standard for forcible ejectment or exclusion of real property. 826
On remand, the district court evaluated testimony from the original
proceeding and concluded that Balsdon forcibly ejected Livinggood.827 The
district court awarded Livinggood treble damages and determined the treble
damage amount by using its original damage calculation of lost profits for
one year, multiplying it by three, and then adding court costs.828 In this
case, Balsdon appealed the district court’s award of treble damages.829
The first issue that the North Dakota Supreme Court evaluated on
appeal was whether the district court should have held a hearing on remand.830 Balsdon impliedly argued that the district court should have held
a hearing on remand, while Livinggood argued that the district court has the
discretion to either hold a hearing or not to hold a hearing because the
North Dakota Supreme Court did not explicitly require that a hearing be
held on remand.831 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the district
court had the discretion to hold a hearing on remand, based on evidence
already before it or with additional evidence collected, and the trial court’s
decision would be reversed only upon an abuse of discretion.832
821. Id.
822. Id.
823. Id.
824. 2006 ND 11, 709 N.W.2d 723.
825. Livinggood, ¶ 2, 722 N.W.2d at 717; see also Livinggood, ¶¶ 7-9, 709 N.W.2d at 725
(stating that Livinggood was not entitled to specific performance of the enforcing the lease, but
was entitled to monetary damages).
826. Id.
827. Id. ¶ 3, 722 N.W.2d at 717-18.
828. Id.
829. Id.
830. Id. ¶ 5.
831. Id.
832. Id. (citing Kautzman v. Kautzman, 2000 ND 116, ¶ 7, 611 N.W.2d 883, 885).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court originally remanded “with directions
to consider the issue of treble damages” under the standard set forth in
Wegner v. Lubenow833 and section 32-03-29 of the North Dakota Century
Code.834 Neither section 32-03-29 of the North Dakota Century Code or
Wegner requires a hearing.835 In determining treble damages, the district
court relied on testimony and the actions of the parties to derive the calculation of multiplying the one-year lost-profit figure by three.836 Balsdon
admitted in his brief that while he disagreed with the facts found by the
district court, “there was a sufficient basis for the trial court to have found
those facts from the evidence at trial.”837 Therefore, the court found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not hold a hearing on
remand.838
The second issue that the North Dakota Supreme Court evaluated on
appeal was whether Balsdon forcibly ejected Livinggood from the farmland.839 Balsdon argued that his actions did not amount to forcible ejectment because Livinggood failed to prove that he feared physical force.840
Additionally, Balsdon asserted that Livinggood did not produce evidence
that he was physically ejected from the farmland, so the treble damage
award should not stand.841 Livinggood claimed that he feared force from
both Balsdon and law enforcement and that he removed himself from the
property because of his fear.842
Section 32-03-29 of the North Dakota Century Code governs damage
entitlements for a party who is forcibly ejected from real property.843 The
North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted section 32-03-29 to mean that a
“district court must award treble damages if it concludes that one person
forcibly ejected or excluded another from real property.”844 Relying on the
two-step process laid out in Wegner, the court found that forcible ejectment
from real property does not require actual physical force, if physical force is

833. 95 N.W. 442 (1903).
834. Livinggood, ¶ 6, 722 N.W.2d at 718 (citing Livinggood v. Balsdon, 2006 ND 11, ¶ 11,
709 N.W.2d 723, 726).
835. Id.
836. Id.
837. Id.
838. Id.
839. Id. ¶ 7.
840. Id.
841. Id.
842. Id.
843. Id. ¶ 9
844. Id; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-29 (2006).
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present and threatened and if it is justly to be feared.845 In other words, a
plaintiff must have reason to believe that he would be subject to the
application of physical force if disobeyed the verbal commands.846 Also, in
an attempt to clarify the standard, the court limited the definition of force
on which Balsdon previously relied.847
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that “the presence and
result of the threat rather than its form of delivery controls” in finding
whether a forcible ejectment existed.848 Because Balsdon came onto the
farmland and twice drove in front of Livinggood’s tractor, claimed that
Livinggood’s lease was invalid, and threatened to call law enforcement,
Balsdon removed himself from the property.849 Therefore, the North
Dakota Supreme Court found that Balsdon forcibly ejected Livinggood
from the leased land.850 Finally, the court found that there was a sufficient
basis for the facts that the district court used to calculate the treble damages
figure, so the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.851
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
district court.852

TORT—NEGLIGENCE—RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY
LEET V. CITY OF MINOT
In Leet v. City of Minot,853 Charles and Jane Leet appealed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment, which dismissed the complaint against
the City of Minot (Minot) and awarded costs and disbursements to

845. Livinggood, ¶ 10, 722 N.W.2d at 719. Wegner outlined a two-step process for
determining forcible ejectment: (1) the district court must determine whether there was sufficient
evidence for the party to experience fear and whether that fear caused the party to leave the
property; and (2) upon finding forcible ejectment, the court shall apply damages, pursuant to N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03-29. Wegner v. Lubenow, 95 N.W. 442, 446 (N.D. 1903).
846. Livinggood, ¶ 10, 722 N.W.2d at 719.
847. Id. In earlier proceedings, Balsdon relied on the definition of force in Helgeson v.
Locken, 130 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1964). The Helgeson Court permitted forcible entry to include
“circumstances which would naturally inspire fear.” Id. at 575. The Livinggood Court determined
that although the Helgeson clause fits in the Wegner standard when it is paired with the other
terms of actual physical violence, it muddled the definition of force, so it limited the definition of
force only in this case. Livinggood, ¶ 11, 722 N.W.2d at 720.
848. Livinggood, ¶ 13, 722 N.W.2d at 720-21.
849. Id. at 721.
850. Id.
851. Id. ¶ 17.
852. Id. ¶ 18.
853. 2006 ND 191, 721 N.W.2d 398.
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Minot.854 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Minot.855 In its reversal, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held: (1) Minot was not precluded from
raising the recreational use immunity as an affirmative defense for the first
time in its summary judgment motion;856 (2) the user’s intent in entering the
recreational property may be considered, but is not controlling;857 and (3)
Charles Leet’s presence at the Minot Auditorium was for employment
purposes, and not for “recreational use.”858 Justice Daniel J. Crothers
concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority opinion.859
In May 2002, Charles Leet was working at the Minot Auditorium to set
up a booth on behalf of his employer, Experience Works, for the Salute to
Seniors event, which was taking place the following day.860 While
working, Charles Leet was injured when a curtain divider system fell and a
pipe struck him on the head.861 Minot owned, operated, and maintained the
auditorium, and city employees had erected the curtain divider system.862
In August 2003, the Leets brought suit against Minot alleging that the city
negligently caused Charles’s injuries.863 It was undisputed that the purpose
for Charles’s presence at the auditorium was to work for his employer.864
The district court granted Minot’s summary judgment motion, finding that
Minot was immune from liability of Charles’s injuries.865
The Leets’s first argument on appeal was that Minot was barred from
raising the recreational immunity defense for the first time in a summary
judgment motion, which was filed less than two months before trial.866
Since recreational use immunity is generally recognized to be an affirmative
defense, the failure to plead it will normally result in a waiver of the
defense.867 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that North
Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) must be read in conjunction with North

854. Leet, ¶ 1, 721 N.W.2d at 401.
855. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 721 N.W.2d at 406-07.
856. Id. ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d at 403.
857. Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 721 N.W.2d at 405-06.
858. Id. ¶ 21, 721 N.W.2d at 406.
859. Id. ¶ 25, 721 N.W.2d at 407 (Crothers, J., concurring).
860. Id. ¶ 2, 721 N.W.2d at 401 (majority opinion).
861. Id.
862. Id.
863. Id. ¶ 3.
864. Id. ¶ 21, 721 N.W.2d at 406.
865. Id. ¶ 3, 721 N.W.2d at 401.
866. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9, 721 N.W.2d at 401-03.
867. Id. ¶ 5, 721 N.W.2d at 401-02; see N.D. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (providing that “[i]n pleading to
a proceeding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense”).
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Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which results in the district court
having sound discretion to amend a pleading upon receipt of a motion.868
Such a decision on a motion to amend a pleading will not be overruled on
appeal unless the district court abused its discretion.869 Here, the district
court effectively granted a motion to amend by permitting the affirmative
defense to be raised for the first time in Minot’s motion for summary judgment.870 The district court also found that the Leets had not alleged any
prejudice, nor was prejudice apparent from the record.871 Moreover, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed that mere delay does not necessarily result in prejudice to the litigant.872 Ultimately, the court concluded
that the district court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable manner when it allowed Minot to raise recreational use
immunity as an affirmative defense for the first time in its summary
judgment motion.873
The second issue addressed by the North Dakota Supreme Court on
appeal was whether the district court erred in concluding that Charles Leet
was using the auditorium for a recreational purpose.874 Minot argued that
Charles’s presence was recreational in purpose because he was preparing
for an event that was recreational.875 The interpretation and application of
recreational use immunity statutes found in chapter 53-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on
appeal.876 The court utilized statutory construction and explored the chapter’s legislative history in order to ascertain the North Dakota Legislature’s
intent behind recreational use immunity.877 Cumulatively, the statutes

868. Leet, ¶¶ 6-7, 721 N.W.2d at 402; N.D. R. CIV. P. 15(a), stating, in part:
A party’s pleading may be amended once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the
party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a
party’s pleading may be amended only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall
plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to
the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
Id.
869.
870.
871.
872.
873.
874.
875.
876.
877.

Leet, ¶ 7, 721 N.W.2d at 402.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
Id. ¶ 9, 721 N.W.2d at 402-03.
Id. ¶ 10, 721 N.W.2d at 403.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id, ¶¶ 13-21, 721 N.W.2d at 403-06.
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provide that where a landowner allows others to use his property without
charging a fee, the landowner does not owe a duty to those persons entering
the property for recreational purposes, including any activity engaged in for
the purpose of exercise, relaxation, pleasure, or education, with a focus on
the user’s actions in entering the landowner’s property.878
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the district court
erred in holding that the landowner’s intent controlled when determining
whether the recreational use immunity statutes applied.879 However, the
landowner’s intent is not irrelevant.880 Although the Court declined to
adopt a specific test, it stated that “[t]he proper analysis in deciding whether
to apply the recreational use immunity statues must include consideration of
the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury
occurs.”881 The court concluded that “[a]lthough Minot’s intent in opening
its auditorium may have been for a public recreational use . . . as a matter of
law Charles Leet’s presence . . . was for employment purposes and not for a
recreational purpose.”882
Justice Crothers concurred with the majority’s decision that the district
court did not err in permitting Minot to raise the recreational use immunity
defense.883 However, Justice Crothers dissented from the majority’s conclusion regarding summary judgment because he believed chapter 53-08 of
the North Dakota Century Code barred the Leets’s claim.884 Justice
Crothers argued that the majority “misread the statutes, misappl[ied]
legislative intent, and reach[ed] a result antithetical to the Legislature’s goal
leading to adoption of recreational use immunity laws.”885 He maintained
that intent of the Legislature in enacting the original recreational use
immunity statutes was to encourage landowners to open their land for free

878. Id. ¶ 18, 721 N.W.2d at 405; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01 (2005) (expanding the
definition of “land” to include “all public and private land”); Id. § 53-08-02 (providing “an owner
of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational
purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition . . . to persons entering for such
purposes”); Id. § 53-08-03 (explaining that a landowner who “directly or indirectly invites or
permits without charge any person to use such property for recreational purposes does not
thereby” assure that the premises are safe, confer on that person a duty of care, or incur liability
for any injury to person or property); Id. § 53-08-05 (excluding limitations on liability for
landowner conduct that is “willful and malicious” in failing to warn users of existing dangers, and
limiting liability for landowners that charge a fee for the recreational use of the land).
879. Leet, ¶ 19, 721 N.W.2d at 406.
880. Id.
881. Id. ¶ 20.
882. Id. ¶ 21.
883. Id. ¶ 25, 721 N.W.2d at 407 (Crothers, J., concurring).
884. Id.
885. Id. ¶ 26.
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recreational use by others.886 Justice Crothers stated that even though the
Legislature later expanded the statutes to include both private and public
land, the intent remained the same.887 He argued that while the Legislature
has continually focused on the owner’s purpose in making the property
available for open access, the majority has focused on the user’s use of the
property.888 As a result, Justice Crothers maintained that the majority
thwarted the Legislature’s goal by reducing, rather than expanding the land
available for recreational use.889

WORKERS’
COMPENSATION
LAW—PROCEEDINGS
COMPENSATION—ATTORNEY’S FEES
ROJAS V. WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INS.

TO

SECURE

In Rojas v. Workforce Safety & Insurance,890 Mark Rojas appealed
Workforce Safety and Insurance’s (WSI) determination that awarded him
only a portion of his attorney fees.891 The North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether Rojas
was entitled to reasonable attorney fees.892 Justice Kapsner wrote a
dissenting opinion.893
In January 2000, Rojas was working as a truck driver and injured his
knee when he slipped on ice at a truck stop.894 He submitted a claim for
workers’ compensation benefits, which WSI accepted and thereafter paid
medical and disability benefits.895 In May 2000, WSI mailed Rojas a
Notice of Intention to Discontinue/Reduce Benefits (NOID) and terminated
Rojas’s benefits on May 31, 2000.896 Rojas claimed that he never received
the NOID and reapplied for disability benefits.897 WSI denied his
reapplication, so Rojas appealed.898 On appeal, WSI found that Rojas failed
to prove that he was entitled to additional disability benefits.899
886.
887.
888.
889.
890.
891.
892.
893.
894.
895.
896.
897.
898.
899.

Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 31, 721 N.W.2d at 408.
2006 ND 221, 723 N.W.2d 403.
Rojas, ¶ 1, 723 N.W.2d at 404.
Id. ¶ 18, 723 N.W.2d at 408.
Id. ¶ 21 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 2, 723 N.W.2d at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 5.
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Consequently, he appealed WSI’s order to the district court, and the district
court directed WSI to reinstate his benefits.900 WSI appealed to the North
Dakota Supreme Court.901
After the appeal was filed, Rojas requested that WSI pay $19,679.83
for attorney fees and costs.902 WSI only paid Rojas $9,876.83 because it
argued that sections 65-02-08 and 65-10-03 of the North Dakota Century
Code limited the amount of recovery for attorney fees in WSI cases.903
Therefore, Rojas petitioned the district court for payment of attorney fees
under section 28-32-50 of the North Dakota Century Code, which permits
reasonable attorney fees in civil judicial proceedings against administrative
agencies.904
The district court affirmed WSI’s determination of attorney fees. 905
The district court concluded that sections 65-02-08 and 65-10-03 supersede
section 28-32-50 for actions involving WSI.906 As interpreted by the
district court, section 28-32-50 grants the district court the discretion to
award attorney fees, while sections 65-02-08 and 65-10-03 mandate a
limited award based upon a specific schedule of fees.907 Therefore, the
district court concluded that sections 65-02-08 and 65-10-03 are special
provisions that control in cases involving WSI, and the sections could not
be harmonized with the general provision of section 28-32-50 that applies
to any civil judicial proceeding against an administrative agency.908
In order to determine which statutes govern attorney fees in WSI
proceedings, the North Dakota Supreme Court examined the North Dakota
Legislature’s intent.909 The court found that sections 65-02-08 and 65-1003 provide an automatic award of attorney fees when an injured employee
prevails against WSI, while section 28-32-50 represents a middle ground
between an automatic award of attorney fees for prevailing against an
administrative agency and an award of attorney fees for frivolous or
meritless claims.910

900. Id. ¶ 6.
901. Id.
902. Id. ¶ 7.
903. Id. at 405; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08 (2005) (authorizing an award of attorney
fees to a prevailing injured employee in WSI proceedings); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-10-03 (2005)
(authorizing an award of attorney fees to an injured party who prevails on judicial appeal).
904. Id. ¶ 8.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12, 723 N.W.2d at 405, 406.
908. Id. ¶ 12, 723 N.W.2d at 406.
909. Id. ¶ 13.
910. Id. ¶ 14.

2007]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

1167

Section 28-32-50 does not grant an automatic award of attorney fees. 911
Instead, to obtain attorney fees under section 28-32-50, a party must: (1)
prevail on the action; and (2) prove that the agency acted without
substantial justification.912 But the court found that the language of section
28-32-50 does not exclude actions against WSI.913 Therefore, the court
found that all three statutes apply to WSI claims in different situations and
can harmoniously be read together.914
The court concluded that a prevailing injured employee is entitled to
attorney fees in WSI actions under sections 65-02-08 and 65-10-03, up to
the statutory limit.915 However, when WSI denies or reduces the employee’s benefits without substantial justification, section 28-32-50 is
applicable to award the employee reasonable attorney fees.916 The court
noted that substantial justification means, “justified in substance or in the
main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.”917 The burden is on the agency to prove that it acted with substantial
justification.918
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
judgment, which stated that section 28-32-50 could not be applied in WSI
cases.919 The court remanded the case for the district court to determine
whether WSI acted without substantial justification, which would warrant
an award of additional attorney fees.920
Justice Kapsner wrote a dissenting opinion.921 In her dissent, Justice
Kapsner argued that Title 65 governs a specific and narrowly defined area
of law than Chapter 28-32.922 Therefore, she determined that sections 6502-08 and 65-10-03 must control over 28-32-50 in cases involving WSI.923
Furthermore, Justice Kapsner stated that the statutes could not be read
together harmoniously because of the explicit language of sections 65-10-

911. Id.
912. Id.
913. Id. at 407.
914. Id.
915. Id. ¶ 16.
916. Id.
917. Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Aggie Investments GP v. Public Service Comm’n of N.D., 470
N.W.2d 805, 814 (N.D. 1991)).
918. Id. at 407-08.
919. Id. ¶ 18, 723 N.W.2d at 408.
920. Id.
921. Id. ¶ 21 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
922. Id. ¶ 22.
923. Id.
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03 and 65-02-08.924 It was her belief that if the legislature had intended
section 28-32-50 to be an exception to the maximum fee exclusions, the
language of section 28-32-50 would not have stated, “a court may not order
that the maximum fee be excluded.”925 Instead, a claimant can apply to
WSI for a fee exceeding the maximum amount in cases of “clear and
substantial merit.”926 Because Justice Kapsner believed that this may be the
type of case with clear and substantial merit, she would affirm the district
court’s judgment.927

924. Id. ¶ 24, 723 N.W.2d at 409; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-10-03 (2005) (stating that a
court may not order an award of attorney fees that exceed the maximum fee); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 65-02-08 (2005) (stating that a hearing officer may not order “that the maximum fees be
exceeded”).
925. Rojas, ¶ 25, 723 N.W.2d at 409.
926. Id.
927. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.

